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CHAPTER - I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Today the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf from 
the f ron t ie r of the Sultanate of Oman t o Khor al-Odaid on 
the Qatar Peninsula comprises of a new p o l i t i c a l ent i ty 
known as the United Arab Emirates or UAE for shor t . The 
coastal area covering t h i s new s ta te which came into 
existence on 2nd December, 1971 i s covered with niomerous 
shoals, reefs , sand banks and half sunken i s l ands . The 
United Arab Emirates comprising over seven emirates known 
as: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sbarjah, Ajman, Umm-al— Qaiwain, Ras-
al-Khaimah on the Persian Gulf in the west and Fujairah on 
the Gulf of Oman in the east i s at present consti tuted as 
a federation covering ail area of about 77,700 sq.km. The 
climate i s ar id with very high temperatures during the 
summers. Barring a few weeks in winter a i r humidity also 
runs very high. The population i s 16,22,464 as per the 
December 1985 census. THe population i s concentrated in the 
emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dxobai, the major petroleum 
producing b e l t s of the country. There are a large number 
of immigrant workers of different or ig ins who exceed the 
native population. 
His tor ical and P o l i t i c a l Perspective: 
The area began X-o come under European influence 
from 16th century when Portugese t r ade r s for the f i r s t 
time establ ished t h e i r settlement and t r i e d to for t i fy 
them. The area was important as it served as a link between 
the overland route to Europe and the sea route to India. 
Gradually traders from Prance* Holland and Britain also 
began to compete with the Portugese in their trade with the 
East. The Arabs in the West and in the south of this area, 
the Turks in Mesopotamia as well as the Iranians were not 
prepared to allowEurope to establish its supremacy over trade 
in this area. This struggle continued till the beginning of 
the I9th century. 
Pirates were very active in the Gulf till early 19th 
century. Raids on British-flag vessels by seafaring Arab 
tribes had become very frequent. In order to curb the 
menace of local pirates attacking British shipping in the 
area, the East India Company planned a military expedition 
in 1820 to destroy the basis of such attacks on their ships. 
This led to a series of treaties between the sheikhs and the 
British East India Company resulting in a 'Treaty of Maritime 
Peace in Perpetuity* in 1853. As a result of these treaties 
the Area had begun to be called as the Trucial Coast. In the 
long run the Treaty took the shape of a sort of a guarantee 
to all the sheikhs of the Trucial Coast given by the British 
crown for their safety from external attacks. So long as 
this umbrella of British Protection was there, no pressing 
need was felt by the sheikhs of the area for the establishment 
of some sort of federation to safeguard their territory and 
handle their external affairs. The idea of the statehood of 
the Western type had always been alien to the tribal organi-
zation of the desert area. New political ideas of sovereign 
states gained prominence with the discovery and exploita-
tion of oil in the area. British interests were taken care 
of by British Political Agents posted in Sharjah, Dubai 
etc. These Political Agents administered their own courts 
concerning the British and non-Muslim subjects. It was only 
in 1960 that the jurisdiction of the British Political Agent 
was abolished. 
During all these years the area was never considered 
as a colony of Great Britain nor was there any foreign 
government like that in India during the British period. 
Treaties for the safeguard of British subjects and interests 
existed with the rulers. With the gradual erosion of British 
influence and rise of political awakening in the area need 
for established, strong and united state capable of safe-
guarding its own interests was felt. Fortunately the area 
possesses a common langauge, common traditions and common 
culture of its own. Fear of encroachments from the neigh-
bouring powerful states might also be one of the factors 
leading towards the establishment of a federal type of 
union bringing in fold different sheikhdoms within- the 
common ambit. In 1971, the British Government announced 
its firm intention of withdrawing from the Gulf region. 
The federation process had already started when on I8th 
February, 1968 rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai entered into 
an agreement to form a union between the two emirates for 
the purposes of foreign affairs, defence, security, social 
services and immigration. They had also agreed to invite 
other rulers of Trucial States together with the rulers of 
Bahrain and Qatar to enter into negotiations for partici-
pation in this federation. On 28th February, 1968, nine 
such rulers signed an agreement in Dubai to establish such 
a federation under the control of a Supreme Council of 
Rulers. This Supreme Council appointed a temporary execu-
tive committee to pave the way in this direction. It also 
appointed a constitutional expert to formulate a draft 
constitution for the proposed federation. However there 
were several obstacles in the process. Bahrain and Qatar 
were not inclined to enter into any sort of union, instead 
they wanted to remain independent. As 1971 seemed to come 
to its end His Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahayan 
broke the ice by unilaterally declaring that Abu Dhabi 
was prepared to participate in the establishment of a 
federation of any number of states and also took some 
preliminary administrative reforms in Abu Dhabi towards 
this end. In July, 1971, rulers of six of the Trucial 
States in a meeting in Dubai finally announced that they 
were prepared to establish the United Arab Emirates. The 
ruler of Ras-al-Khaimah neither supported nor opposed the 
decision at that moment. However this seventh state was 
also admitted in the new federation on lOth February, 1972. 
The United Arab Emirates which came into existence 
on 2nd December, 1971 soon became a member of the Arab 
League and also was declared the 132nd member of the 
United Nations Organisation. It was made a member of 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1974. 
Constitutional Framework; 
A provisional constitution was adopted by the federa-
tion for a period of five years. It was to then expire 
when a formal constitution would be drafted. However no 
formal constitution has been drafted till date. The same 
constitution has been renewed time and again imparting 
flexibility to the developing states to follow a gradual 
course of centralisation. The executive consists of a 
President, a Vice President and a Federal Cabinet headed 
by a Prime Minister. Sheikh Zayed-bin-Sultan al Nahayan 
ruler of Abu Dhabi became the first President of the 
Federation. The ruler of Dubai Sheikh Rashid bin Said al-
Maktoum became its first Vice President and Crown Prince 
of Dubai Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid became the f i r s t 
Federal Prime Minister . Half of the cabinet ministers did 
not belong to the ruling family. Since then the same 
president and vice president have continued in of f ice . 
Although Sheikh Rashid, ru le r of Dubai has replaced his 
son as prime minister since "uly 1979. (while retaining 
the vice-presidency). In the Council of Ministers, the 
ministers are chosen on the bas is of individual merit 
instead of equitable representa t ion. 
An assembly cal led the Federal National Council has 
been const i tuted under the cons t i tu t ion . I t comprises of 
4 0 members, the break up being 8 members each from Sharjah 
and Ras-al-Khaimah and 4 each from Ajman, Umm-al-Qaiwain 
and Fujairah. Each Emirate appoints i t s own representa-
t i v e s separately. The Assembly studies the laws formulated 
by the Council of Minis te rs . I t can re ject them or suggest 
amendments which must f ina l ly be r a t i f i ed by the Supreme 
Council of Rulers. The Supreme Council consis ts of the 
seven ru le r s and e l ec t s the president , the vice president 
and the prime minister from amongst them. 
Each of the member uni t contr ibutes 10% of i t s 
income to the Federal Budget but major financing to the 
budget comes from Abu Dhabi followed by Diobai. Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai have pledged t o contribute 50% of t h e i r petrolexara 
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revenues to the budget. 
Economic Backdrop; 
A regressive movement into the economic history of 
United Arab Emirates shows that the economy of UAE prior 
to the discovery of oil was a primitive, simple and 
localised economy. The entire economy mainly hovered 
around pearling, fishing and date farming. The only 
plank of contact with the world economy was provided by 
the pearl industry. The history of the oil industry in 
the Emirates pre-dates the formation of the United Arab 
Emirates/ and covers a span of nearly more than half a 
century. On January 19, 1936, the first oil agreement 
was signed between Abu Dhabi and Petroleum Development 
Trucial Coast Limited (PDTC). Other Emirates followed suit, 
signing similar concessions with the same company. 
After the Second World War and in the light of its 
preliminary exploratory findings, PDTC relinquished its 
concession rights in the Arab Emirates. Later however, 
concessions were granted to several other companies. The 
most important of these were the offshore concessions 
granted by the Emirate in 1954 to Abu Dhabi Marine Areas 
Limited. In 1958, oil in commercial quantities was dis-
covered. The oil agreements which arose from these finds 
were of course, typical of the inequitability which 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d t he t e r ras imposed by t h e foreign p a r t n e r s on 
a l l host governments in o i l producing a r ea s a t t h a t t i m e . 
In November, 1971, t h e Government of Abu Dhabi 
e s t a b l i s h e d t h e Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). On 
December 20, 1972, t h e Government of UAE signed the f i r s t 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n agreements with the major o i l companies 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g in t h e area , namely Abu Dhabi Petroleum 
Company Ltd.(ADPC) for onshore o p e r a t i o n s , and Abu Dhabi 
Marine Areas Ltd (ADMA) for offshore o p e r a t i o n s . Under 
t he se agreements, t h e Government represen ted by ADNOC, 
acquired 25% of ADPC and ADMA a s s e t s and from January 1, 
1973 became a p a r t n e r in t h e i r concess ions . Under a fu r the r 
agreement signed on Devember 2, 1974, ADNOC's i n t e r e s t in 
t he se concessions was r a i s e d t o 60% with e f f ec t from 
January 1, 1974. 
The discovery of o i l in 1958, when i t was f i r s t 
found off Abu Dhabi, and s p e c i a l l y s ince June 1962, when 
i t was f i r s t exported has marked t h e b i r t h of a modem 
growing s t a t e draped in an e l i t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e soc ia l 
s e rv i ce s p a r a p h e r n a l i a . Since independence t h e o i l and 
n a t u r a l gas resources have been p r o g r e s s i v e l y brought under 
t he fold of s t a t e c o n t r o l . 
The product ion of crude petroleum rose firmly 
from an aggregate of 695,000 b a r r e l s pe r day in 1970, 
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when Abu Dhabi was t h e only producer of 1.68 mi l l i on b /d 
in 1974. At t h i s t ime Dubai produced 242,000 b /d and 
Shar jah ' s output had commenced at a r a t e of 28,000 b / d . 
Product ion of crude from the t h r e e Emirates in 1977 
reached a high l e v e l of 1.99 mi l l i on b /d before dec l in ing 
t o 1.83 mi l l i on b /d in both 1978 and 1979. In the follow-
ing year Abu Dhabi ' s share was 1.4 6 m i l l i o n b / d , Dubai ' s 
354,000 b /d and Shar jah ' s 13,000 b / d . Almost t h e e n t i r e 
output i s expor ted . In February 1981 Abu Dhabi ' s output 
was cut t o 1.2 m i l l i o n b / d , the lowest f igure for s ix 
years . 
In 1983 Abu Dhabi produced 69.9% of t he UAE's 
petroleum output of 1*1 mil l ion b /d , Dubai 29.5% and 
Sharjah 0,5%. Average product ion in 1983 of Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai and Sharjah was approximately 850,000 b /d , 330,000 
b /d - 360,000 b /d and above 50,000 b / d r e s p e c t i v e l y . By 
t h e end of 1984, Abu Dhabi ' s product ion l eve l was repor ted 
t o be running a t 6,20,000 b /d . In 1985 UAE produced 
15,44,000 b /d and Abu Dhabi exceeded i t s product ion 
quota . 
1. "OPEC Mennber Country P r o f i l e s " ; S e c r e t a r i a t OPEC, 
Vienna, ( A u s t r i a ) ; p . 120, 1983. 
2 . "The Middle East and North Afr ica"; Europa P u b l i c a t i o n s , 
London (U.K.); edn. 34; p . 834, 1988. 
3 . OPEC Annual S t a t i s t i c a l B u t t e t i n , OPEC S e c r e t a r i a t , 
Vienna ( A u s t r i a ) ; p . 15, 1986. 
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From the oil revenues realized, the Emirates has 
embarked upon ambitious developmental progammes mainly infra-
structure viz ro^ds, electricity, health, communication, 
free education etc. Value of oil comprises 60% of the GDP 
and over 90% of the export revenues. But now more attention 
is being focussed on diversification of the economy through 
industrialization, agriculture and fisheries. The paucity 
of natural resources and limited workforce are a technical 
constraint to its economic development ambitions. The 
decrease in the oil demand in early 1980's and a consequent 
reduction in prices brought about a sharp decline in XJAE's 
GNP. In 1983/ at the time of imposition of quota by OPEC 
nations UAE possessed sizeable excess capacity due to the 
new upper Zakum field in Abu Dhabi. From that time there 
has been a federal budget deficit, which rose to $ 1.5 
billion in 1983, and the government has tried to cut down 
on expenditure, with projectsbeing postponed. 
The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) - a 
government controlled company manages entire petroleum 
installations and allied oil based industries throughout 
UAE. Offshore exploration was initiated by the Abu Dhabi 
Marine Areas (ADMA), and now ADMA-OPCO (Abu Dhabi Company 
for Onshore Oil) produce over 90% of the petroleum of the 
Emirate. The quota levels introduced by OPEC caused the 
reduction in the nximber of operating rigs, and further 
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development has been rescheduled . However, maintenance and 
replacement of equipment remains a v i t a l requirement . 
The D\ibai Petroleum Company (DPC) in Dubai opera tes 
one onshore deposi t a t Margham 1 and 4 offshore f i e l d s . 
Shar jah ' s new onshore f i e l d , Sajaa,came on stream in 1984, 
i t s Abu Musa offshore f i e l d dec l in ing in recent y e a r s . 
Ras-al-Khaimah has s t a r t e d producing o i l , but as yet in 
small q u a n t i t i e s . Explora t ion cont inues in t h e nor thern 
Emira tes . 
UAE possesses 11% of t h e global o i l r e se rves which 
i s v i t a l in the context of domestic and i n d u s t r i a l economy. 
The L iqu i f i ed Natural Gas (LNG) from Abu Dhabi t h e major 
producer i s exported through the Abu Dhabi Gas L iqu i f i c a t i on 
Company (ADGAS). The p l a n t s a t Das I s l a n d and a t Ruwais 
are run by gas . Behaviour in t h e p roduc t ion , demand and 
supply t r e n d s of o i l i s d i r e c t l y p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t r e n d s in 
gas . So a cut i n t he product ion of o i l has a f fec ted t h e 
product ion of ga s . Dubai gas indus t ry i s operated by t h e 
Dubai Natural Gas Company (DUGAS). The f r a c t i o n e r a t Jebel 
Ali p rocesses gas from i t s offshore f i e l d s . The Amoco-
Sharjah Oil Company has l a r g e r e se rves of gas in t h e Sajaa 
f i e l d . The Emirates General Petroleum Company has cons t ruc ted 
a gas g r id for supply t o i n d u s t r i e s i n t h e nor thern emira tes 
and a gas pipe l i n e upto J ebe l Ali I n d u s t r i a l Area. 
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Industiryt 
The government of UAE i s diversifying the economy 
to reduce dependence on the export of crude o i l and gas. 
All major indus t r ies are hydrocarbon re la ted e i the r d i rec t ly 
or ind i rec t ly with concentration at Ruwais and Jebel Ali . 
Dubai Aliiminix:im (DUBAL) smelter was established in 1979 
along with a desal inat ion and power p l a n t . DUBAL uses gas 
as i t s fuel which i s supplied t o i t free of charge and the 
al\jmina i s imported from Austra l ia . The Free Trade Zone at 
Jebel Ali Port i s arousing increasing in t e r e s t in indus t r i e s . 
Abu Dhabi embarked upon the indus t r ia l i za t ion 
programme with the gas l iqu i f i ca t ion plant at Das Island 
and the Uram-Al-Nar refinery as i t s steping stone. At 
Ruwais, a 120,000 b/d refinery and LPG plant began opera-
t ing in 1981. In 1983 Ruwais F e r t i l i z e r Indus t r ies (FERTIL) 
plant was established, which produces ammonia and urea. A 
hydrocracker plant has been set up in 1985, with i t s 
assemblage to the ref inery . 
Sharjah i s laying down i t s own hydrocarbon indus t r ies 
and the Sharjah Liquified Gas Company (SHALCO) was set up 
to i n s t a l l a LPG p l a n t , . Majority of the Indus t r ia l ventures 
at Sharjah are producing consumer items but there ex i s t s 
one cement plant (one of seven in the UAE) and a huge fodder 
factory at Mina Khaled Por t . 
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Among other emirates in the north; Ras-al-Khaimah 
has the highest development at Khor Khuwair with a pharma-
ceutical factory, 2 cement factor ies and a t h i rd for white 
cement. Quarrying of limestone i s also carr ied out over 
here. Fujalrah has few small indus t r ies producing mainly 
rockwool, aggregates and crushed rock. Ajman i s treasured 
with Arab Heavy Indus t r i e s . A jo in t venture with MODEC of 
Japan has been signed for ship-building and s tee l fabrication.At 
Umm-al-Qaiwain there i s a cl inker - grinding factory. Besides 
a ^ e s t o s pipes and sheeting are being produced. 
Manufacturing i s being encouraged by the Emirates 
Indus t r ia l Bank which provides managerial assistance and 
low in t e r e s t loans for viable pro jec ts , preference being 
given to those using local raw mater ia l s . The present 
indus t r ia l scenario emphasises building mater ia ls , p l a s t i c 
goods, soft drinks and other consumer goods, but the small 
size of the domestic economy, high labour costs and strong 
overseas competition are a cons t ra in t . The ending of the 
Gulf war would great ly help, and so would a further 
lowering of ba r r i e r s of t rade within the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. Already, c i t i zens of one gulf s t a t e are permitted 
to es tab l i sh companies in other s t a t e s . 
Primary Sector: 
The ar id climatic conditions of UAE make i t d i f f icu l t 
to believe tha t self sufficiency in food would be achieved. 
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but steps are being taken by the Federal Government to reduce 
total dependence on imports. Various measure to conserve 
water are being taken up. A large desalination project was 
completed in Abu Dhabi at Taweelah in 1987. Constant efforts 
are being made for frugal and optimum use of recycled water. 
The most rain fed area is Ras-al-Khaimah where 15% of the 
land is used for agriculture. Here a variety of vegetables 
are grown. Privately owned dairy farms supply about 15% of 
the milk demanded. It is estimated that poultry projects 
shall meet about 40% of chicken demand and 70% of egg demand. 
The traditional fishing industry is being provided with 
modern equipment fitted boats and research in fish breeding. 
Trade Policy: 
The UAE maintains a free and open trade policy* with 
no exchange controls, and only a few restrictions. The latter 
exclude all trade with South Africa and Israel, and maintains 
the Arab boycott of companies involved with Israel, Agree-
ment with the Gulf Cooperation Council imposes a general 
customs duty of 4% on c.i.f, value, but certain items such 
as foodstuffs, medicines and pxiblic sector goods are exempt. 
However, there are still differences between emirates such 
as the charge for goods in transit (exempt in Sharjah), 
and the rate for items such as cigarettes and alcohal, Abu 
Dhabi exempts samples under a value of Dh 5 00, whereas in 
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Other emirates, a l l samples are exempt. There arc no r e s t -
r i c t ions on the movement of goods inside the UAE. VUth 
regard t o agencies, "only nat ionals or companies wholly 
owned by UAE nat ionals may be appointed agents, and must 
be regis tered with the Federal Ministry of Economy and 
Commerce" . 
Foreign Trade; 
The main item of export i s the crude o i l . Inspi te 
of the f a l l over the l a s t few years i t s t i l l comprises 74% 
of the t o t a l exports . Gas exports account for 8.8%. Other 
exports and entrepot t rade accounts for 16,8%, Non-oil and 
gas exports const i tu te petroleum products and manufactured 
goods pr inc ipa l ly aluminium from Dubai. Dubai's t r ad i t i on 
of entrepot t rade continues t o t h r i v e . 
Economic History of UAEt 
It is essential to look in retrospect at the 
economy of UAE before the discovery of oil so as to be 
able to realize the impact the flow of oil has brought 
about. It would be relevant to mention over here that 
prior to the formation of UAE on 2nd December, 1971 the 
seven emirates that comprise UAE were mere neighbouring 
^' Federal Agency Law, Ministry of Law, UAE, 1982. 
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states but their existed social, economic* cultural and lin-
guistic bonds which have facilitated the creation of the 
federation. 
Prior to the discovery of oil/ the economy of UAE 
was a sxibsistence economy. It was simple and primitive. 
Pearl fishing was its mainstay. Besides there was fishing, 
animal husbandry, agriculture, simple trades and other 
services. The economy suffered with seasonal unemployment 
as most of the activities were seasonal in nature. Until 
the outbreak of the Second World War the pearling industir/ 
enacted as the economic linchpin of the Arab emirates and 
nearly 80% of its workforce was directly or indirectly 
involved in it, whereas the remaining 20% worked in 
agriculture, grazing of cattle and in fishing . The 
Government merely looked after the imposition of taxes and 
law and order. The pearl industry operated on the principle 
of free enterprise. Over the time period the pearl industry 
has been greatly affected by the vacillations in market 
forces (i.e. demand and supply) and prices. It was at its 
zenith in the period anteceding the upsurge of the First 
World War. In repercussion of the economic depression that 
plagued the entire world from 1929 "to 1933, the demand for 
5. A standard of living yielding no more than the bare 
" necessities of life, that is, the lowest standai^ i 
compatible with existence. 
6. Al-Qtaiba M.S. "Petroleum and the Economy of the United 
Arab Emirates", Croom Helm, London tU.K,;, p. TlT 1977. 
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pearls slid down sharply but the market recapitulated its 
buoyancy thereafter and burgeoned till the outbreak of the 
Second World War. 
The post World War II period witnessed a downturn 
in the pearl industry thus throttling the progress of the 
Trucial States. The paramount causes for decline of the 
pearling industry were: 
1. Introduction of the Japanese 'cultured pearl' which 
was much cheaper and could be sold on the world 
market at a price far less than the natural pearls 
harvested in the Trucial States. 
2. The worldwide depression during the 1930s resulted in 
the loss of conspicuous consumption item markets, 
such as in France and Italy. 
3. World War II caused a reduced demand for Trucial Coast 
pearls, as their large American and European markets 
were lost, 
4. The fatal blow came in 1946, when India, a large market 
for pearls ceased the importation of pearls from the 
Trucial Coast. The Indian Law was later repealed and 
replaced with an import levy on pearls so heavy that 
the pearling industry was still unable to export to 
India. Besides after the parition of India in 1947 and 
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abolition of maharaja (princely)rule the demand for 
natural pearls further collapsed in this important 
segment as these wealthy maharajas had a great liking 
7 
for the pearls . 
Due to the fadeing demand for pearls, the n\amber 
of pearling boats gradually diminished. The Trucial States 
contact with the rest of the world began to shrink at an 
ever increasing rate as the industry faltered and World 
o 
War I I accelerated the backsliding . 
The pearl ing depression had severe adverse impact 
on the economy of Abu Dhabi/ only Dubai was able to keep up 
with t h i s dampening economic environment on account of i t s 
trafficking in gold although small. In India the price of 
gold was well-nigh twice that of the world market p r i ce , 
which promoted the movement of unrecorded gold thus offering 
9 
an opportunity to buy at lower pr ices . 
An autopsy of the f inancial s t a t i s t i c s reveals the 
significance of the Dxabai harbour t o the emirate. Due to 
i t s locat ional and geographical posi t ion Dubai enjoyed an 
7. Fenelon, K«G.?"The Trucial States"; Longman, London (U.K.), 
p. 29, 1973. 
8. Hawley,D.; "The Trucial States"; George Allen and Unwin 
Ltd, London (U-K.), pp. 105-106, 1971. 
9. Ibid., p. 205. 
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advantageous posi t ion for entrepot t rade in the V/est Asian 
region. 
Upto 1940, the Br i t i sh confined themselves t o the 
maintenance of maritime t ruce , thus keeping themselves 
aloof from the socio-economic in ternal a f f a i r s . The f i r s t 
attempt for the betterment of l iv ing conditions was made 
in 1939 by the Br i t i sh Government by opening a dispensary 
in Dubai with an Indian doctor . The next step in t h i s 
direct ion was the planning of a hospi tal in 1941 and i t s 
establishment in 1949 with the appointment of a Br i t i sh 
doctor. The construction of the hospital was perhaps the 
ea r l i e s t Br i t i sh policy ref lec t ing the assxamption of social 
r e spons ib i l i t i e s for socio-economic development. From t h i s 
modest beginning, the pace of economic development in the 
Trucial States has been continuous. In 195 2 money was 
al located for a p i l o t survey of water resources, well 
d r i l l i n g and creeks at Dubai and Sharjah which had been 
s i l t i n g up. In 1954-55 further grants were sanctioned for 
the res tora t ion of fa la jes (underground canals) at 
Buraimi Oasis, a well boring programme in Ras-al-Khaimah, 
improvement of the Dubai hospi ta l and building of a f i r s t 
modern school in Sharjah. Total funds al located for the 
10 period 1954 - 56 were £ 30,300-^ . 
10. I b i d . , p . 227. 
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Encouraged by t h e p rog res s of t h e developmental 
programmes Mr. J . P . Tripp t h e P o l i t i c a l Agent in 1955 
proposed a 'Five Year Development Plan* with an expendi-
t u r e ou t lay of £ 450,000 . The scheme was endorsed by Sir 
Bernard Burrows, t h e P o l i t i c a l Resident and approved by 
the B r i t i s h Government, Thus t h e F i r s t Five Year Plan was 
dra f ted in 1955 and implemented in 195 6 . The plan aimed 
at modernising educa t ion , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , cons t ruc t ion of 
a bu i l d ing for t h e T ruc ia l S ta t e s Council and improving 
j u d i c i a r y by appoint ing Qadhis (judes) of high c a l i b e r . I t 
a l so focussed on impart ing impetus t o a g r i c u l t u r e . An 
A g r i c u l t u r a l T r i a l s S ta t ion and an Agr i cu l t u r a l School 
were e s t a b l i s h e d at Ras-al-Khaimah in 195 6, A Trade School 
was se t up in Sharjah b e s i d e s a host of o the r p r o j e c t s 
which included a small a g r i c u l t u r a l c r e d i t scheme, t e ache r 
t r a i n i n g for Truc ia l S t a t e s boys in Bahrain , elementary 
school b u i l d i n g s , a number of d i s p e n s a r i e s , campaign 
aga ins t malar ia and expansion of the Dubai Hosp i t a l . The 
F i r s t Plan had a b i a s towards soc ia l reforms r a t h e r than 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e reforms. F i r s t Five Year Plan yearwise 
ou t lays and expendi tures a re shown in Table i . l . 
The out lay was in excess over expendi ture as 
£ 97,871 could not be u t i l i z e d . Thus t h e ou t l ay was In 
excess over .expendi ture .by23.81% in t h e F i r s t Five Year 
1 1 . I b i d . 
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Table 1.1 
F i r s t Five Year Plan Outlay 
Year 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
Tota l 
Source: op . c i t w 
Outlay 
31,000 
65,000 
85,000 
100,000 
130,000 
411,000 
p . 20. 
and Expenditure 
Actual Expenditure 
(£) 
27,000 
63,750 
64,325 
73,054 
85,000 
313,129 
23 
Plan for the period 1956-61. Moreover in the yearwise break 
up outlay has been continuously in excess of the expenditure. 
Sources available to us do not provide any explaination 
to this effect but one can attribute the short fall to the 
either of the following or all the three of them: 
1. The actual resource mobilisation fell short of the 
approved allocation. 
2. Administrative lapses constrained the actual spending. 
3. Absorptive capacity was less. 
Mr. D.F. Hawley the Political Agent in i960 envisaged 
an ambitious Second Five Year Plan proposal for the period 
1961-66. But due to British economic recession the proposal 
was mared and only £ 5/50,000 were approved. These funds 
financed such projects as a trade school at Dubai (in 
financial collaboration with the rulers of the emirate), 
hospital improvements and soil conservation in Ras-al-
Khaimah due to storms. 
In 19 65 a Development Office was set up under the 
12 
aegis of the Trucial States Council and the Council 
decided that all the aid to the Trucial States should be 
chanelled through the Development Fund. In a move to 
seperate the Council from the Agency, the Political Agent 
12. The Trucial States Council was established In 1950 
without any written constitution. It became responsible 
for the ever growing development programme initially 
financed by the British Government. 
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stepped down from the chairmanship of t h e Council in 1966 
in favour of one of t h e r u l e r s . The f i r s t r u l e r s to be 
e l ec t ed chairman of the Council was Sheikh Saqr ibn Muhammad 
of Ras-al-Khaimah. 
I n i t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e T ruc i a l S ta tes Deve-
13 lopment Fund were , 
B r i t a i n £ l m i l l i on (over 3V2 years) 
Qatar £ 250,000 
Abu Dhabi £ 200,000 
Bahrain £ 40,000 
Abu Dhabi ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n a f t e r t h e access ion of 
Sheikh Zaid ibn Sultan u n t i l mid 1968 were-^^: 
£ V2 mi l l ion on access ion 
£ 365,000 Apri l 1967 
£ 1 m i l l i o n September 1967 
B.D. 337,662 August 1968 
In 1968, t h e p r o v i s i o n s for va r ious heads under 
t h e T r u c i a l S t a t e s Counc i l ' s Budget were r e - s t r u c t u r e d 
and in t h e same year a census was c a r r i e d out with funds 
provided by t h e ru l e r of Abu Dhabi, Some h i g h l i g h t s of 
t he census s t a t i s t i c s a re given in Table 1.2 & 1.3. 
13. I b i d . , p . 229. 
14. Il2id. 
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T a b l e 1«2 
Area and P o p u l a t i o n of t h e E m i r a t e s (1968, Census) 
S t a t e Area P o p u l a t i o n (Sq.km.) 
Abu Dhabi 26,000 46 ,500 
Dubai 
Shar jah 
Ajman 
Umin-al-Qaiwain 
Ras-a l -Khaimah 650 24,500 
F u j a i r a h 450 9,700 
T r u c i a l Oman Scou ts - 1,000 
T o t a l 30,000 180,200 
Source : Compiled from F e n e l o n , K.G-; "The T r u c i a l 
S t a t e s " , Longman, London (U-K<), p p . 1 4 4 - 1 4 6 , 
1973. 
1,500 
1,000 
100 
300 
59,000 
31,500 
4,200 
3,700 
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Table 1.3 
Distribution of Population as per the Professions 
Profession 
Agriculture & Fishing 
Manufacturing, Mining & Qxiarrying 
Construct ion 
Oil Indus t ry 
Wholesale /Reta i l Business 
Banking 
Transport & Communications 
Government Service 
Other Occupations 
To ta l Work force 78,071 
Source: op . c i t . , p . 25. 
Population 
1 3 , 
3 , 
19 , 
3 , 
8, 
8, 
12, 
8 
541 
,029 
,874 
,062 
• 028 
730 
,534 
,683 
,590 
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The o t h e r donor s of a i d t o t h e T r u c i a l S t a t e s i n 
t h e 19 60s were Kuwait , Q a t a r , Bah ra in and Saudi A r a b i a . 
Kuwait e s t a b l i s h e d a s i z e a b l e f i n a n c i a l and t e c h n i c a l 
a s s i s t a n c e prograinme f o r t h e T r u c i a l S t a t e s s e t on foo t w i t h 
a m i s s i o n i n 1962 t o e x p l o r e t h e f u t u r e p r o s p e c t s of t h e 
T r u c i a l S t a t e s a s an a i d r e c i p i e n t . As a fd l low up t o t h i s 
programme a s t a t e o f f i c e was s e t up i n Dubai t o c o - o r d i n a t e 
e d u c a t i o n a l and h e a l t h p r o j e c t s . 
S i m i l a r l y o t h e r c o u n t r i e s p r o v i d e d a i d t o u n d e r -
w r i t e such p r o j e c t s a s Saudi A r a b i a ' s £ 1 . m i l l i o n t o l a y 
down a road from Shar jah t o Ras -a l -Kha imah , Qatar 's a i d t o 
c r e a t e f r e s h w a t e r supp ly i n Dubai t h e c a p i t a l and t h e 
j o i n t v e n t u r e between Q a t a r and B a h r a i n t o p r o v i d e t e a c h e r s 
f o r p romot ion and development of e d u c a t i o n . 
In 19 68, t h e c a p i t a l e x p e n d i t u r e was t o t h e t u n e 
of $ 3.5 63 m i l l i o n , whereas i n 1969 t h e c a p i t a l e x p e n d i -
t u r e r o s e t o $ 4 . 6 0 8 m i l l i o n a p p r o x i m a t e l y . Thus t h e r e was 
an i n c r e a s e of $ 1.045 m i l l i o n o r 29 .3%. The b r e a k up of 
1 6 t h e funds f o r d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s was a s f o l l o w s : 
I n t e r s t a t e p r o j e c t s 37% 
Shar jah 17.5% 
Ajman 4% 
15 . QPi c i t . , p . 25. 
16 . I b i d . 
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Umm-al-Qaiwain 7% 
Ras-al-Khaimah 16% 
Fuja i rah 18% 
Dubai 0.5% 
Due t o t h e i r r i s i n g o i l revenues Dubai recieved 
only 0.5% aid from t h e Development Fund and Abu Dhabi did 
not r e c e i v e any a id a t a l l . I n s t ead both Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai have become donors s ince then r a t h e r than r e c i p i e n t s . 
Besides t h e Truc ia l S t a t e s Council Development Fund, Abu 
Dhabi e s t a b l i s h e d t h e Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic 
Development (ADFAED) in J u l y , 1971 under t h e chairmanship 
of H.H. Sheikh KhaHfa-bin-Zayed al-Nahayan, . The ADFAED 
s t a r t e d with an o r i g i n a l au thor ized c a p i t a l of Dh 500 
m i l l i o n . In Ju ly 1974 t h e Fund ceased t o be exc lus ive ly 
Arab, with t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n under p r o v i s i o n s of Law No.(7) 
1974 t o o f fe r a id in add i t ion t o African, Asian and o the r 
I s l amic n a t i o n s , i t s o r i g i n a l au thor ized c a p i t a l was 
increased from Dh 500 m i l l i o n t o Dh 2,000 million•^'^. 
Abu Dhabi i s t h e only sheikhdom t o break the i ce 
on i t s own for a development p l a n . In 1968, t he F i r s t Five 
Year Plan for t h e per iod 1968-72 was in t roduced with a t o t a l 
ou t lay of $ 612.3 m i l l i o n . I n f r a s t r u c t u r a l f a c i l i t i e s 
received t h e l i o n s share i . e . 41% of t h e t o t a l o u t l a y . I t 
needs a spec ia l mention t h a t $ 63 m i l l i o n i . e . 10.28% of 
17. 'Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development' , Annual 
Report, 1974. 
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the outlay was designated for regional development progra-
rrnies in other Trucial S ta tes . The p l an ' s p r i o r i t i e s were 
in the following order: 
economic and social in f ras t ruc ture , 
industry and 
18 
agr icul ture 
Allocation of funds t o agr icul ture was humble due 
to the l imited agr icu l tu ra l base of the economy. Around 
1Q 4 2% of the t o t a l plan a l loca t ions endorsed a general 
indus t r i a l survey, e l e c t r i c a l power and d i s t r ibu t ion 
(including a desal inat ion plant for Abu Dhabi City) and 
petrochemicals. The petrochemicals project was heavily 
capi ta l intensive conceptualizing a gas l iqu i f ica t ion 
p lant , refinery and chemical production such as insecticides^ 
Related t o in f ras t ruc tura l f a c i l i t i e s were the construction 
and building materials i ndus t r i e s . Some al locat ions were 
also made to the t r a d i t i o n a l vocations such as pearling 
and f ishing. A close scrutiny of the plan reveals tha t i t 
was income-distributive and economy-diversifying in nature . 
Later developments suggest tha t in f la t ion s ign i f i -
cantly slashed the p l a n ' s a l locat ions leaving many projects 
18. El M a l l a k h , R.; "The Economic Development of UAE"; 
Croom Helm, London ( U . K . ) , p p . 23-24 , 1 9 8 1 . 
19. I b i d . 
under-budgeted. "In 1969 Abu Dhabi incurred an overall 
budget deficit of approximately $ 31.8 million^ partly-
due to lower realized oil revenues for 1968 than antici-
20 
pated" . In order to coup up with this inflationary-
pressure the government formulated some deflationary 
measures such as reducing staff, deferring certain payments 
and concentrating more on ongoing projects rather than 
beginning new ones. Although the inessential bureaucratic 
staff was cut down, yet the problem of the shortage of 
skilled labour remained. 
Two illations from the plan are that the emirate 
did not slip into the pitfall of excessive spending on 
prestige and dramatic public building as only 3.8% of the 
total allocations was for this purpose. Secondly direct 
wealth distributive measures were kept at a bay as these 
tend to result in the distortion of relationship between 
economic effort and reward. 
The plan aimed at bringing about a sectoral balance 
through diversification. It is heartening that agriculture 
was given a solemn consideration especially in the eastern 
province. This was augmented more due to the personal 
concern of Abu Dhabi's ruler who was incharge of eastern 
20. El Mailakh, R.; ^he Middle East Journal, p. 144, 1979. 
Table 1.4 
Petroleum Export Revenues (1970-1987) 
31 
Year 
Petroleum Export 
Revenues 
( in m i l l i o n US $) 
% Change 
i n P e t -
r o l e u m 
E x p o r t 
R e v e n u e s 
-
+ 4 8 . 0 
+ 3 8 , 9 
+ 8 7 . 0 
+ 2 7 2 . 0 
- 2 . 6 
+ 2 2 . 1 
+ 1 0 , 5 
- 5 . 5 
+ 4 9 . 7 
+ 5 1 . 4 
- 3 . 7 
- 1 8 . 4 
- 2 0 . 2 
+ 6 . 0 
- 9 . 0 
- 3 6 . 3 
+ 1 6 . 1 
P e t r o l e u m 
E x p o r t 
R e v e n u e s 
a s % of 
T o t a l 
E x p o r t s 
9 2 . 7 
8 5 . 3 
8 5 , 0 
8 6 . 6 
9 4 . 1 
9 3 . 7 
9 2 . 9 
9 0 . 8 
8 7 . 7 
8 7 . 3 
8 9 . 0 
8 6 . 3 
8 4 . 2 
7 9 . 5 
8 1 . 2 
7 9 . 9 
7 4 . 1 
7 2 . 8 
E x p o r t 
R e v e n u e s 
( i n 
m i l l i o n 
US $) 
5 2 3 
84 2 
1.174 
2 , 1 5 6 
7 , 3 8 0 
7 , 2 1 8 
8 , 8 9 1 
1 0 , 0 6 2 
9 , 8 3 2 
1 4 , 8 0 1 
2 1 , 9 6 7 
2 1 , 7 9 2 
1 8 , 2 2 4 
1 5 . 3 9 1 
1 5 , 9 9 0 
14 ,764 
1 0 , 1 2 9 
1 1 , 9 7 9 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
4 85 
7 1 8 
9 9 8 
1,867 
6 , 9 4 8 
6 , 7 6 2 
8 , 2 5 8 
9 , 1 3 2 
8 , 6 2 4 
1 2 , 9 1 5 
1 9 , 5 5 8 
1 8 , 8 1 5 
1 5 , 3 3 7 
1 2 , 2 3 5 
1 2 , 9 7 8 
1 1 , 7 9 9 
7 , 5 0 9 
8 , 7 2 1 
Source: OPEC Annual S t a t i s t i c a l B u l l e t i n 19 87, pp . 5,6 & 8, 
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region at that time. It was expected that Abu Dhabi would 
be able to cater to the basic food requirements of neigh-
21 
bouring emirates as well . Import subst i tu t ion indust r ies 
selected were not very much feasible due t o the limited 
domestic market, though a few indus t r ies l i ke cement and 
building mater ia ls were s ign i f ican t . Down stream operations 
in the petroleum sector are re la ted to o i l and o i l r ece ip t s . 
During the F i r s t Five Year Plan and in the succee-
ding years the value of petroleum exports rose rapidly for 
UAE upto 1980 and then declined upto 19 86 and again rose 
in 1987. From the data in Table 1,4 we observe tha t the 
percentage contribution of petroleum to t o t a l exports i s 
very high. If the above data i s organised in to two periods 
viz 1970-80 and 1981-87 then we see tha t the percentage 
contribution of petroleum in the f i r s t period i s 89.55% 
where as in the l a t t e r period i t i s 79.71%. This implies 
tha t the revenues earned by the export of o i l have reduced 
by 10% approximately though petroleum exported in absolute 
terms has increased. This trend suggests towards a be t t e r 
economic environment because i t means tha t the contribution 
of non-oil sector has improved. Thus i t can be surmised 
that revenues real ised from o i l have unfolded a way to 
21. I b i d . , p . 145. 
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d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of t he economy. A n a t u r a l c o r o l l a r y t h a t 
emerges from t h i s a n a l y s i s i s ; t h e impact of o i l p r i c e s 
and revenues on the economy of UAE? In t h e ensuing 
chapte rs an e f f o r t sha l l be made t o t e s t t h i s hypo thes i s . 
Purpose and Plan of t h e Study; 
The aim of the work r epo r t ed in t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n 
i s t o study c e r t a i n a spec t s of o i l p r i c e and revenue 
i n t e r a c t i o n s on the economy of United Arab Emirates which 
mainly include t h r e e a spec t s of t h e economy v i z ; t he 
economic development, t he i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and t h e 
foreign t r a d e . Agr icu l tu re though a v i t a l s ec to r t o any 
economy has been excluded because i t s con t r ibu t ion t o 
t h e GDP i s very meagre,approximately 1^19% over t h e 
decade. Cirude o i l s ec to r has c o n s t i t u t e d 48.97% t o t h e 
GDP for the pe r iod 19 78-87 and ranks f i r s t in i t s share 
t o t h e GDP. 
Chapter - I , i s a p re lude t o t h e geographical 
l oca t ion of UAE, a b r i e f r e t r e a t i n to the h i s t o r i c a l 
pe r spec t i ve of UAE, i t s formation on 2nd December, 1971, 
i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l locus s t and i and i t s economic p o s i t i o n 
both before and a f t e r t h e d iscovery of o i l . We-have dea l t 
with t h e s e a spec t s b r i e f l y so as t o provide a meaningful 
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background for the following chapters . However,".we discuss 
in some d e t a i l s the economic s t ructure of the Emirates 
too in t h i s chapter. 
In chapter - 11/ we provide his tor ical-cum-anal \^ical 
evolution of the o i l industry in the Emirates. This chapter 
begins with the his tory of the o i l concession agreements 
and for a b e t t e r uaiderstanding divides the whole period 
into three d i s t i n c t sxib-periods of: ( i) Old Agreements, 
( i i ) New Agreements and ( i i i ) Par t ic ipa t ion Agreements. 
Salient features of these agreements are examined and a 
comparative analysis i s attempted. Having provided the 
bas i s for the significance of o i l , we t r ace the his tory 
of o i l discoveries and production in various Sheikhdoms. 
The chapter also highl ights the manner in which gradual 
control of the o i l industry has been achieved by the 
Governments. 
Chapter - I I I , t r i e s to analyse the usage of o i l 
revenues in the economic development process of the 
economy. I t also s t r ives to comprehend the changes brought 
about in the economic edif ice of UAE with the fuell ing 
of the o i l weal th . I t surveys the contribution of different 
sectors to the GDP over the time period. The chapter also 
takes an account of the o i l p r ices since the formation of 
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UAE. I t f u r t h e r co r robora t e s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p in the chang-
ing o i l p r i c e s / revenues and product ion and consequently 
t h e i r impact on the va r ious c o n s t i t u e n t s of t he economy. 
Chapter - IV, t a k e s a s tock of t he i n d u s t r i a l 
scenar io in t h e Emira tes , I t a t t e r rp t s t o view t h e techno-
logy employed, the d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n i f any, t h e i n d u s t r i a l 
p o l i c y , t h e r o l e of t h e government, a ca ta loguing of t he 
i n d u s t r i e s , t h e market p r e s s u r e s and the c o n s t r a i n t s 
imposed by the l imi t ed popula t ion base of t h e count ry . 
Chapter - V, t a b u l a t e s the foreign t r a d e s t a t i s t i c s 
of UAE. Crude o i l dominates the expor t s and consequently 
t h e changes in o i l p r i c e s a f f ec t t h e foreign t r a d e sec to r 
of UAE. The emira tes t r a d e in non-o i l products as v;ell 
but t he se are mainly r e - e x p o r t s . This chap te r - a lso 
ca lendars the s t r u c t u r e of r e - e x p o r t s , imports and the 
d i r e c t i o n of crude o i l . The a id disbursements by UAE have 
a l so been taken in to account . 
The l i m i t a t i o n s t o t h e study a r i s e from the f a c t s 
t h a t very few conprehensive resea rch s t u d i e s on the 
economy of UAE have been made. Secondly, access t o some 
very b a s i c primary sources of data has been a c o n s t r a i n t . 
Thirdly, most of the s t u d i e s undertaken on UAE have been 
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disjointed and either emiratewise or on a single emirate. 
Therefore availability of integrated and unified data 
about UAE has posed problems off and on. This problem has 
been tried to overcome wherever possible by trying to 
redesign the data formats so as to bring about continuity 
and a more unified picture of one country as one entity, 
one federation and not as seven different emirates. 
CHAPTER - II 
OIL CONCESSION AGREEMENTS AND THE EVOLUTION 
OF OIL INDUSTRY IN UAE 
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On 11 January, 1939, t he f i r s t o i l concession 
for a pe r iod of 75 years was granted by the r u l e r of 
Abu Dhabi t o Petroletim Development T ruc i a l Coast (PDTC) • 
On 24 Ju ly 1962, t h e name of t h i s company was changed 
t o Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC). The PDTC l a t e r 
ADPC was owned by a conglomerate of d i f f e r e n t companies 
belonging t o Al l i ed Powers of World War I • The share 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e s e companies in PDTC was as follows:"'" 
B r i t i s h Petroleum Company (BP), U.K. 23.75% 
Shell Petroleum Company L t d . , Dutch 23.75% 
Corapagnie Francaise des P e t r o l e s (CFP), 
France 23.75% 
Near East Development Corporat ion, USA 
( i t s e l f equally owned by Exxon and Mobil 
Oil) 23.75% 
Partex, Gulbenkian interests 5% 
The concession covered the entire Abu Dhabi 
emirate, including its territorial waters and islands. 
After Abu Dhabi, the rulers of D\ibai and other emirates 
concluded similar concession agreements with this company, 
thus placing the whole territory of the United Arab 
Emirates at its disposal. 
The first exploratory drilling was undertaken 
by ADPC in 1950 , 11 years after it had obtained concession 
1. F.M.A. Cards, Arab World File; No. 1888? May 6, 1981. 
2. Ibid. 
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ADPC's first discovery was at its fourth well, at Bab, 
in December 1960, and its second at Bu' Hasa in 1962. 
Other commercial discoveries followed at Asab in 1965, 
Sahil in 1972 and Jam Yafur in 1973. In the meantime, 
however, ADPC had gradually been relinquishing parts of 
its original concession, retaining less than 40% by 
1971. The Abu Dhabi government acquired its initial 
stake in ADPC in 1972 (at a time when participation 
agreements were reached between most Gulf countries and 
their concessionaires) and sxobsequently increased this 
from 25% to 60% in 1974. Today UAE remains the only 
Gulf country apart from Oman not to have claimed 100% 
3 
ownership of its oil industry . Petroleum was discovered 
in commercial quantities in Abu Dhabi in 1958, in Dubai 
in 1966 and in Sharjah in 1972. 
For a better understanding, the oil concession 
agreements are being divided into three categories viz. 
the old agreements, the new agreements and the parti-
cipation agreements. 
Old Pattern of Oil Agreements; 
These agreements, which wrapped the Middle East 
and were signed before the Second World War coalesced 
3. Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Profile - UAE; 
p. 19, 1988-89, 
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similar as well as distinguishing features despite their 
settlement with different countries. 
"The seven large international oil companies, 
4 
known as the Seven Sisters # had by the Achnacarry Cartel 
and Red Line Agreements agreed to divide amongst them-
selves the concession areas of the Middle East into 
5 
spheres of influence and not to compete with each other".. 
The old oil concessions had the following common features: 
i) The agreements were drafted and prepared by the 
oil companies in the period when the countries of the 
region were either British Colonies or British protec-
torates and so the rulers of the area were coerced to 
sign them under British military threats. Therefore, 
the agreements were unilaterally formulated and not 
bilaterally drafted and so naturally partisan and 
exploitative in nature. Under such a situation it is 
obvious to presume that the companies would have catered 
to the interests of the Union Jack and their parent 
countries which had permitted them a free hand in the 
conduct of business along with a complete package of 
benefits and privileges which included tax exemption 
4. These were: British Petroleum, Standard Oil of 
California, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Gulf Oil, 
Shell, Mobil Oil and Texaco. France's CFP is some-
times included, 
5. Al-Otaiba, M.S., "Petroleum and the Economy of the 
United Arab Emirates"; Croom Helm, London .^O.K,;, 
p. 39, 1977. 
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in add i t ion t o safeguarding t h e i r monopol i s t ic p o s i t i o n . 
Dr. Mana Saeed-al-Otaiba t he petroleum m i n i s t e r of UAE 
in h i s book Petroleum and the Economy of UAE argues t h a t : 
"such agreements though p r o f i t a b l e for a t ime , in fact 
germinated t he seeds of t h e i r own d e s t r u c t i o n . This i s 
evident from the fac t t h a t as soon as t he coun t r i e s of 
t he reg ion got independence they l o s t no time in r ev i s ing 
t he old concession agreements . This in fact happened in 
t he United Arab Emirates." 
i i ) A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t he se concession agre^nents 
was t h e abso lu te coverage of t he country encompassing 
i t s e n t i r e land and t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s . Thus pre-empting 
a chance for any o t h e r o i l company t o opera te in the 
count r y . 
i i i ) The old concession agreements were for very 
lengthy t ime pe r iods extending upto seventy f ive y e a r s . 
The ADPC's concession agreement was for a per iod of 
seventy f ive y e a r s . 
iv) The f i n a n c i a l terms and cond i t ions were u n j u s t . 
The o i l companies used t o pay small r oya l ty annual ly 
before o i l was d i scovered . This roya l ty was marginal ly 
r a i s ed with t he confirmation about t h e discovery of 
o i l . Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company for example paid an 
42 
annual roya l ty of $ 25,000 u n t i l t he o i l had been d i s -
covered in f a c t . This amount was doubled when t h e o i l 
was discovered and l oca t ed p r e c i s e l y . The agreement 
f u r t h e r made a p rov i s ion of approximately 10 cen ts pe r 
b a r r e l when o i l product ion commenced. The UAE's p resen t 
7 income amounts t o $ 17.92 pe r b a r r e l • 
v) The monopol is t ic na ture of t h e old concession 
agreements excluded t h e host coun t r i e s from p a r t i c i p a -
t i o n in t h e c a p i t a l of t h e conce-ssion holding companies. 
The d o c t r i n e of p a r t i c i p a t i o n had been t o t a l l y ruled 
o u t . 
v i ) There did not e x i s t any prov iso c a t e r i n g t o t he 
p r i o r i t y in employment for n a t i o n a l s of t he host count ry . 
Rather t h e r e was an i m p l i c i t at tempt t o make t h e country 
dependent on foreign t e c h n o c r a t s and l abour . 
v i i ) Under t h e o ld concession agreements the o i l 
companies were under no l i a b i l i t y t o help or p a r t i c i p a t e 
in the process of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of t h e host coun t r i e s . 
There did not e x i s t any commitment t o i n d u s t r i a l i z e the 
host coun t r i e s perhaps t h e reason was t o keep them as a 
6. Ibid., p. 40. 
7. OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, OPKC Secretariat, 
Vienna (Austria); p. 130, 1987. 
This was the official selling price on 1st Feb, 1987. 
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captive colonial market for the products of imperial 
enterprises. The new concession agreements provide for 
the local processing of petroletixa and gas. 
New Oil Concession Agreements; 
With the closure of World War 11/ the oil companies 
returned to the United Arab Emirates though they were 
more vigorously engaged in the surrounding countries 
where oil had already been discovered. On getting a 
favourable outcome in the discovery of oil in commercial 
quantities from almost the entire West Asia region, the 
companies apportioned some of the revenues to the host 
governments which were needed by them for developmental 
purposes. At the same time having earned political and 
economic sovereignty, the oil exporting countries made 
efforts to remove the impediments and hurdles that had 
been created to keep them at bay, and initiated a dialogue 
among themselves. These countries realized they could 
get their due only through collective bargaining. Thus 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
was established in 1960, to link countries whose main 
source of earning is petroleum. The Organization acts 
as a forum for discussion of and agreement on the level 
at which the member countries should fix the price of 
their crude petroleum exports. At the same time there 
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developed a consciousness among these countries that the 
existing monopolistic oil companies were detriTnental to 
their interests, and so endeavours were made to revise 
old agreements. Moreover the entry of independent oil 
companies was encouraged. 
The salient features of the new oil concession 
agreements were as follows: 
i) Unlike the old agreements, the new agreements 
limited the freedom of action and privileges of the oil 
companies. Since the new agreements were signed on the 
basis of economic principles and not under political or 
military pressure, they shielded the interests of the 
host country. Earlier a particular company used to enjoy 
monopoly over the host country and therefore it could 
enforce its own conditions, but under the new system oil 
exploration rights are awarded to a company whichever 
comes first on the basis of competitive bidding offering 
the most acceptable price and terras. Due to the inter 
company competition, the oil exploration countries have 
benefitted greatly in achieving better terms and 
conditions. As also the entry of independent oil 
companies has been made possible, in turn breaking the 
monopoly of old companies and extending competitive 
offers. 
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ii) In the new agreements each company is allocated 
a specified area of the host country's territory and 
not the absolute coverage of the country. 
iii) Under the new agreements provisions exist for 
relinquishment of specified portions of the concessionary 
territory. The provision empowers the host country to 
award concessions to other companies on more favourable 
terms. 
iv) The concession period has been cut down to twenty 
to twenty five years as opposed to long concession 
periods extending upto seventy five years in old conce-
ssion agreements. 
v) The new oil concession agreements embody better 
financial terms. In the new agreementS/ companies have 
to pay higher pre - oil discovery annual payments. On the 
discovery of oil/ the host country is entitled to 20% 
royalty plus income tax at 85%. Now the host country 
receives major share of the oil revenues. Besides 
within the framework of new agreements, the oil companies 
are required to spend a certain specified amount annually 
on exploration and drilling and if any amount is left 
unutilized from within the agreed amount then that has 
to be paid to the host country. 
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vi) The new concession agreements offer a choice to 
the host countries to participate in the share capital 
of the operating company on discovery of oil in commer-
cial quantities. The extent of such participation varies 
from agreement to agreement. The principle of partici-
pation was incorporated in the old agreements in 1972 
and it ranges from 50% to 80%. The principle of parti-
cipation has given a new direction to the relations 
between host countries and the oil companies operating 
in them. 
vii) The new concession agreements give priority to 
local labour force in recruitment to the oil companies. 
This has also helped the host countries in preparing a 
technically trained manpower to hold responsible positions. 
Besides generating employment this has paved a way for 
a better utilization of Arab skills and talent. 
viii) The new concession agreements also extend finan-
cial and technical aid for the establishment of industry 
in the host country unlike the old concession agreements 
which absolutely had no commitment to help in the indus-
trialization of the host country. These new concession 
agreements also provide for local processing of oil and 
gas. 
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Participation Agreements; 
After long deliberations, lasting for more than 
a year, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia conclu-
ded in December 1972, participation agreements v.'ith 
major oil companies operating in their respective 
territories. Other countries joined the ensemble. 
The implementation of the principle of participa-
tion brought about changes in the relationships between 
the operating companies and the host countries from the 
legal as well financial standpoint. The new agreements 
directly involved the oil exporting countries in techno-
economic and legal aspects of the oil industry. Following 
advantages have been derived from the participation 
agreements. 
Not only a sizeable amount of financial benefits 
have accrued to the oil exporting countries but recovery 
of a greater part of the profits from the foreign oil 
companies has been made possible. Participation on 60% 
basis has meant that 60% of the profits previously that 
had gone to the foreign companies have been chanelled 
to the government. The participation of the governments 
in the oil industry has further afforded them a chance 
to re-invest a part of oil income more profitably and 
securely. 
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Due to participation, the host governments are 
no more mere tax collectors or just excercising their 
control over their natural resources but have taken 
their due place as effective partners. They have a 
strong say in taking of decisions concerning all the 
stages of the oil industry. 
The contact between different government agencies, 
companies of the host countries and foreign oil companies 
has led to the transfer of technology. Earlier the 
expertise and technology was confined to foreign oil 
companies only. But now the participation agreements 
have opened a door for the host countries to absorb and 
assimilate the desired technology and thus train themselves 
to manage the oil industry. 
After becoming partners in the oil industry, the 
host governments have started marketing their share in 
the produce directly in the international market. 
Previously this was done exclusively by the oil companies. 
This has afforded the oil producing countries a better 
price. Moreover a direct contact with other countries 
also helps in the political process. 
The application of the principle of participa-
tion has generated industrial activity in these economies. 
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The area of special attraction in the realm of industri-
alization has been the downstream operations, A part of 
their share in the oil produced is processed in their 
own refineries. Petrochemical and gas liquification 
plants have been set up. It has also led to a change 
in the international economic relations between the oil 
producing and oil consuming countries. 
Oil is the mainstay of the UAE economy. It was 
first discovered in Abu Dhabi, at the offshore field of 
Umm Shaif in 1958 and at the Bab field onshore in 1960. 
The fields were developed steadily and Abu Dhabi soon 
became a major oil exporter by world standards. Oil was 
discovered in Dubai in 1966 at the offshore Fateh field, 
with production and exports starting in September 1969. 
The onshore oil and condensate Murgham field came on 
stream in 1983. Sharjah had a share in the small Mubarak 
field, off Abu Musa island, from the time this came on 
stream in 1974. At the end of 1980 AMOCO discovered oil 
and gas at Sajaa field of Sharjah. Lately Ras-al-Khaimah 
also joined the band of oil exploring emirates. Its off-
shore field was discovered. Gulf Oil made an announcement 
to this effect in February, 1983. The remaining three 
p 
emirates are still scanning for oil . 
8. Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Profile - UAE; 
p. 2S, i5ii6-B5. ' — 
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The evolution of oil industry in UAE has to be 
traced emiratewise due to the following reasons: 
i) The emirates entered into a federation called 
UAE only in December, 1971. 
ii) The constraint imposed due to the literature 
available in disintegrated form. 
Abu Dhabi; 
In September 1958, Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd 
(ADMA)^  made i t s f i r s t discovery in t h e Umm Shaif f i e l d . 
Exports began in 1962 when a t e rmina l was b u i l t a t 
Das I s l and and a 22 mi l e , 18 inch p i p e l i n e l a i d t o 
connect t he we l l s with t h e t e r m i n a l . The second f i e l d , 
Zakxim, was discovered in 1963. After a 56 mi le , 26 inch 
submarine pipe t o Das I s l a n d was l a i d , product ion 
began ' . I n December expor ts commenced from t h e 
onshore Murban-Bu-Hasa f i e l d , from which, al though i t 
i s only 12 miles ir i land, crude had t o be taken 70 miles 
westward by a 24 inch p i p e l i n e t o Jebe l Dhanna where 
t h e r e i s s h e l t e r e d deep wa te r . A t a n k e r t e rmina l with 
two loading b e r t h s was b u i l t t h r e e mi les out a t sea . 
9 . Al Otaiba , M.S.; "Petroleum and t h e Economy of United 
Arab Emira tes" , Groom Helm, London (U.K.) , p . 49, 1977 
ADMA was e s t b l i s h e d on 18 May 1954, owned 2/3rd by 
B r i t i s h Petroleum (BP) and V3rd by Compagnie Francaise 
des P e t r o l e s (GPP) and the concession was t r a n s f e r r e d 
t o i t on 22 March 1955. 
IQ. World Petroleum Report; X, 69, 1964. 
1 1 . World PetrolexOT;XLI, 63-65, 1970. 
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Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company Ltd (ADPC) expanded f a c i l i -
t i e s at the f i e l d t o make p o s s i b l e t h e export ing of s ix 
13 14 mi l l i on tons a year . 
ADMA and ADPC concessions provided for t he payment 
of 20% of p r o f i t s t o t h e Government. In 1965 ADPC revised 
t h e agreement with t he Sheikh which increased t h e share 
in p r o f i t t o 50%, roya l ty was t o be paid as per t h e OPEC 
formula and the Company was t o r e l i n q u i s h unexploi ted 
a r e a s . A s i m i l a r agreement was signed with ADMA on 
November 10/ 1966-^^"-'-'^. 
As t h e e s t a b l i s h e d companies r e l inqu i shed from 
t h e t e r r i t o r i e s of t h e i r concession a r ea s , concessions 
were granted t o new companies for exp lora t ion of o i l in 
t h e of f -shore and on-shore . 
Onshore concessions were accorded t o a c l u s t e r 
of t h r e e companies v i z , P h i l l i p s Petroleum, a U.S. company, 
12. Al Otaiba , M.S.; "Petroleum and t h e Economy of United 
Arab Emira tes" , Groom Helm, London (U.K,), p . 45, 1977. 
Petroleum Development T ruc i a l Coast Ltd (PDTC) was 
e s t a b l i s h e d in Great B r i t a i n on 30 September 193 6, 
obta ined on 11 January 1939 a seventy- f ive year 
concession for o i l exp lo ra t ion in Abu Dhabi Emirate 
which covered the whole of t h e Emira te ' s land and 
marine t e r r i t o r i e s as wel l as i t s i s l a n d s . On 24 Ju ly 
1962, t h e name of t he company was changed t o Abu Dhabi 
Petroleum Company Ltd (ADPC). 
13 . Eetroleum P r e s s Service , XXXI, 28> 1965. 
14. World Petroleum Report, XI, 68, 1965. 
15. BP Annual Report, 25, 1966. 
16. World Petrolevim, XXXVIII, 44, 1967. 
17. World Petroleum Repolrt, X l I I , 66, 1967. 
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Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (AGIP), an Italian 
company and American Independent Oil Company Ltd (Aminoil)/ 
another U.S. company encompassing an area of 13,000 sq.kms. 
Another onshore concession was signed in September 1969. 
This concession had an allowance for 50% participation 
by the Sheikh on commercial discovery subject to paying 
of certain costs. 
Offshore concessions were awarded in 1968 to Abu 
Dhabi Oil Company (a Japanese company). In June 1970, 
concession was assigned to a batch comprising of Pan 
Ocean Corporation, Syracuse Oils and V^ ington Industries 
occupying an area of 3,150 square kilometers. The Sheikh 
could exercise the option of upto 50% participation on 
commercial discovery by paying half the costs, over a 
period of 10 years""-®'"'•^  . 
In 1967, Abu Dhabi joined OPEC, and in 1968, the 
Government signed new agreements with ADMA and ADPC, 
eliminating OPEC allowances of posted prices. Three 
years later ADPC began supplying natural gas from the 
Murban field to Abu Dhabi Power Generation Plant^°'^•'•. 
1 8 . I b i d . 
1 9 . World Petrolexim, pp, c i t . , p . 5 1 . 
20 . Pe t ro l eum P r e s s S e r v i c e , XXXV, 304, 1968. 
2 1 . World P e t r o l e u m R e p o r t , XVII, 64 , 1 9 7 1 . 
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The Britishers withdrew from the Trucial States 
in 1971. The seven sheikhdoms formed a union and thus 
emerged United Arab Emirates on 2nd December 1971, The 
same year, the Government of Abu Dhabi by virtue of 
Law No 7 of November, 1971 established the Abu Dhabi 
National Oil Company (ADNOC). In accordance with Article 3 
of Law No 1, the company is to function in all spheres 
of the oil industry both at home and abroad, "including 
prospecting and exploration for oil and natural gas and 
other hydrocarbons; and production, refining, transporta-
tion and storage of said materials and any of the by -
products thereoff". Article 3 also has a provision for 
the company to trade in these materials by products and 
derivatives by distribution, sale and exportation. 
On December 20, 1972, the Government entered into 
maiden participation agreements with the leading oil 
companies working in Abu Dhabi, namely Abu Dhabi Petro-
leum Company Ltd (ADPC), and Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd 
(ADMA). Within the framework of these agreements the 
Government with ADNOC as its representative aquired 25% 
of ADPC and ADMA assets and, from January 1, 1973 became 
a partner in their concessions. Under a further agreement 
concluded on December 2, 1974, ADNOC's interest in these 
concessions was raised to 60%, in retrospect from January l, 
1974. 
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This 60% shareholding for ADNOC and 40% for other 
partners gave a more comprehensive control to the govern-
ment over oil industry and its management besides excer-
cising sovereignty and calling the tunes over its 
natural resources. The Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Operating 
Company (ADMA-OPCO) was incorporated on July 3/ 1977/ 
and the Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations 
(ADCO), on October 8, 1978. 
ADNOC and the Japanese Development Company (JODCO) 
formed the Umm-al-Dalkh Development Company (UDECO) on 
October 1, 1977, as the operating company for the 
concession area. Initially ADNOC and JODCO owned 50% 
shares each. Later the agreement was revised on September 
10, 1978 with ADNOC's shares increasing to 88% and JODCO's 
shares decreasing to 12%. On March 18, 1978, ADNOC and 
JODCO entered into a participation agreement for the 
Upper Zakum Concession Area, with 88% and 12% shares of 
each respectively. The Abu Dhabi Executive Council in 
/^ril, 19 80 endowed the right to explore five onshore 
and offshore areas approximately 3 6% of the total area 
of Abu Dhabi to ADNOC. This resolution by the executive 
committee for the first time enabled ADNOC to explore 
hydrocarbons independently at its own risk. On July 5, 
1981, ADNOC signed a participation agreement with JODCO 
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for the development of Delma, Satah and Jemain offshore 
field. The shareholding of ADNOC was 60%. In 1983, ADNOC 
drilled two offshore and one onshore well. The discoveries 
22 
were reported in the first half of 1984 
In 19 84, ADNOC and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 
(ADIA) signed a joint venture to build an overseas marke-
ting infrastructure. It was taken over by the government 
in 1987. ADNOC maintains a host of concerns viz. National 
Marine Dredging Company, National Drilling Company, 
National Petroleum Construction Company, Abu Dhabi Pipe-
line Construction Company, National Company for Marine 
Services, Abu Dhabi Petroleum Ports Operating Company 
and Abu Dhabi National Tanker Company. All ADNOC companies 
have been subjected to frugal economic controls and 
centralisation since the oil shock of 1986 to the 
producers. This was for the first time in the history of 
oil industry since the formation of OPEC that the prices 
tumbled down to such a low level and the shock was received 
by the oil producers. It nose dived to an all time low 
23 
of approximately $ 8,1/b 
In 1980, a number of new oil concessions were 
announced by the Abu Dhabi government as the concessions 
22. OPEC Bulletin; XV(lO), 20-24, 1985. 
23. op. cit., p. AZ» 
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av;arded in 1960s to various companies were being abandoned, 
These were announced as the Phase I in new oil and gas 
exploration drive. Four new onshore areas were marked and 
handed over. The first was to north of Al-Ain, which went 
to Ai-iOCO, The second being in the east and south of Abu 
Dhabi city went to a Canadian group headed by Sceptre 
Resources. The third and fourth blocks covering the area 
near Bu Hasa, Asab and and Bab oil fields went to a 
consortium led by Amerada - Hess Corporation (a U,S. 
company). The Phase II for offshore oil explorations 
came in 1981. The first offshore concession in this 
phase was awarded to a consortium led by Deminex of 
West Germany for Abu Dhabi offshore. Later in the same 
year, a further block was awarded to Attock Oil, a 
Pakistani Company. The same time period synchronized a 
number of oil and gas finds several of them being of 
substantial importance. These included crude at Umm-al-
Lulu and oil and gas at West Mubarraz. In the third 
quarter of 19 84, Thamama C gas came on stream from a gas 
treatment plant at Bab. The gas is used by Abu Dhabi 
Water and Electricity Department for power generation. 
Due to promulgation of oil production cuts by the 
UAE as part of its policy within OPEC, Abu Dhabi oil 
57 
Crude 
Y e a r 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
19 84 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988* 
S o u r c e : 
T a b l e 2 . 1 
O i l P r o d u c t i o n i n UAE • and Abu D h a b i ( 1 9 7 9 - 8 8 ) 
( T h o u s a n d B a r r e l s p e r d a y ) 
D a i l y 
A v e r a g e 
1 , 8 3 0 . 7 
1 , 7 0 1 . 9 
1 , 5 0 2 . 3 
1,24 8 . 8 
1 , 1 4 9 . 0 
1 , 0 6 9 . 0 
1 , 0 5 6 . 8 
1 , 3 0 8 . 9 
1 , 4 1 7 . 7 
1 , 5 0 0 . 0 
UAE 
% Change 
i n D a i l y 
A v e r a g e 
-
- 7 . 0 
- 1 1 . 7 
- 1 6 . 9 
- 8 . 0 
- 7 . 0 
- 1 . 1 
- 2 3 . 9 
8 . 3 
5 . 8 
OPEC Annual S t a t i s t i c a l 
• E c o n o m i c I n t e l l i a e n c e 
D a i l y 
A v e r a g e 
1 , 4 6 0 . 7 5 
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production went down significantly since 1980 onwards. 
Further cuts were again agreed by OPEC in 1984, so the 
oil production further slid down and Abu Dhabi bore the 
greatest brunt of the cuts. UAE has seldom complied 
with the limits of the OPEC quota. It abandoned all 
pretence of observing its official quota in March 1988, 
with production by the end of 1988 soaring to iB^OO^OOOb/d^"^ 
Table 2.1 shows that whenever the UAE production 
has gone down, the Abu Dhabi production has also gone 
down, except for the years 19 85 and 1986. In these two 
years the production of crude from Abu Dhabi was boosted 
herhaps to increase the contribution to UAE•s total 
produce as Abu Dhabi is the largest producer from amongst 
all the sheikhdoms. This conjecture is further corroborated 
by the fact that the percentage share of Abu Dhabi to 
UAE rose to more than 70% as compared to 65.5% in the 
preceding year. 
Dubai: 
The f i r s t concession in Dubai was granted t o 
Dubai Marine Areas Ltd (DUMA) in 195 2. Two t h i r d of i t s 
shares were owned by B r i t i s h Petroleum (BP) and one 
t h i r d by CFP. In 1963, Diibai Petroleum Company (DPC) , a 
24. Economic Int.elll(;7enr!e Unit ^ Country P r o f i l e - UAE, 
p . 23, 1988-89. 
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wholly owned subsidiary of the Continental Oil Company 
(CONOCO) of the U.S.A., acquired a concession for both 
offshore and onshore. The same year (CONOCO) purchased 
50% shares of DUMA and was designated operator of the 
25 concession 
In 1956, oil was discovered for the first time in 
Dubai by DPC in an offshore concession . In 1969, DPC 
discovered the Fateh field located 55 miles off the 
coast and began production in September 1969. By that 
time CONOCO sold 20% of its holdings: 5% to German V.'inter-
shall Company, 10% to Deutsche Erdol (Texaco) and 5% to 
27 Sun Oil Company . Export from Fateh field also started 
in September 1969. 
In November 1970, another field Southwest Fateh 
was found with production commencing from October 19 72. 
Third field named Hashed after the ruler of Dubai was 
discovered in 1973 and started production of oil and gas 
from six wells in 1979. A fourth field, Falah, started 
production in June 1978 and a fifth the Margham onshore field 
with prospects of sizeable reserves was discovered by 
25. World Oil, CLIX, 177, 1964. 
26. op. cit., p. 5,3, 
2 7 . World Petrolevim R e p o r t , XVII, 76 , 1971 . 
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Arco Dubai (a subsidiary of the US Atlantic Richfield 
Group) in 1982. From amongst all these explorations, the 
order in terms of their productivity is: Fateh, Southwest 
Fateh, Falah and Hashed. Overall Dubai production started 
declining in 1978. Due to this drop and the promise 
shown by Margham, the Dubai government accorded seven 
more concessions between 1982 and 1983. So far no commer-
cial discoveries have been made. 
Dubai's associated gas was flared up in the initial 
years of oil discovery, but in 1975 after the oil price 
rise of 1973-74, Dubai established the Dubai Natural Gas 
Company (DUGAS) to exploit gas produced from the 
Sheikhdom's offshore fields as well from Sharjah. 
DUGAS has 80% of Dubai government's share and 20% of 
Scimitar Oils, a subsidiary of Sunningdale Oils of 
Canada. DUGAS facilities to gather gas have been expanded 
to Pateh, Southwest Fateh and Rashed and a second compressor 
plant was installed in 1986. A special gas terminal at 
Jebel Ali which can handle gas tankers upto 48,000 tons 
was inaugurated in ^ril 1980 and began exporting from 
July 1980. Besides it is structured to process the residual 
gas which is consumed domestically and the remainder is 
28 
exported to Japan by DUGAS 
28. Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Profile - UAEj 
p. i4, i$88-89. 
61 
Sharjah; 
The f i r s t o i l concession in Sharjah was granted, in 
1962 t o an American company John W, Mecom, However, no 
discovery was r e p o r t e d . Another concession was granted 
in 1969 t o a consortium of d i f f e r e n t companies known as 
Crescent Oil Company. 
The f i r s t success by Crescent Oil was made in 1972, 
when o i l was d iscovered in commercial q u a n t i t i e s in t h e 
Miibarak formation known as Mubarak-1. In 1973# t h e company 
discovered low-sulphur o i l in i t s second well-Mubarak-2. 
This well a l so produced n a t u r a l g a s . The t h i r d discovery 
was made in Mubarak-3/ a t a d i s t a n c e of 3 mi les from 
Mubarak-1. Large r e se rves of o i l were discovered by the 
company in 1975 in i t s well Mubarak-4, a f t e r having 
shipped Sharjah"s f i r s t shipment of crude in 1974. Oil 
product ion dec l ined in 1977 and the Mubarak f i e l d was 
d i s rup t ed by I r a n i a n war p lanes in April 1988 but 
revived i t s product ion a few months l a t e r though the 
average product ion pe r day was s i zeab ly reduced. Enhanced 
product ion was t a r g e t e d for 1989. 50% of Mubarak f i e l d ' s 
revenues are taken away by I r a n . Out of t he remaining 
50%, Sharjah t a k e s 30% Ajman and Umm-al-Qaiwain 10% each. 
In 1980, AMOCO discovered o i l and gas in t he Sajaa 
f i e l d , about 20 mi les west of Oman mountains. This i s 
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Table 2.2 
Share Composition of Different Companies In 
Crescent Oil Company 
Companies % Share Composition 
Butes Gas and Oil Company 
Ashland Oil Company 
Skelly Oil Company 
Kerr - McGee 
C i t i e s Service Company 
Jun ipe r Petrole\im Corporation 
25.7 
25.0 
25.0 
12.5 
10.0 
1.8 
Source: op . c i t . , p . 6 0 , 
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Table 2«3 
Fleld/V.'ellwlse Oil Production in Sharjah 
IBarrels per day) 
Year Oil Field/Well Amount 
1972 Mx;ibara>: - 1 1 3 , 9 5 5 
1973 Mxibarak - 2 5 9 , 9 0 0 
1974 Mxobarak - 3 
1975 Mubarak - 4 
1976 M u b a r a k f i e l d 3 8 , 2 0 0 
1977 Mubarak f i e l d 2 8 , 2 0 0 
1988 Mubarak f i e l d 8 , 0 0 0 - 9 , 0 0 0 
* 19 89 Muba rak f i e l d 1 2 , 0 0 0 
S o u r c e : Al O t a i b a , M . S * ; " P e t r o l e u m and t h e Economy ol= 
U n i t e d Arab E m i r a t e s " , Groom Helm, London ( U - K * ) , p . u 8 , 
1 9 7 7 . 
o p . c i t _ . , p . 6 0 . 
• T a r g e t e d p r o d u c t i o n . 
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Table 2.4 
Share Composition in Sharjah LPG Plant 
Organizations % Share Composition 
Sharjah Government 
AMOCO 
JGC Corporation (Japanese) 
Tokyo Boeki (Japanese) 
6 0 . 0 
2 5 . 0 
7 . 5 
7 .5 
Source: Economic I n t e l l i g e n c e Unit / Country P r o f i l e -
UAE; pp . 24-25, 1988-89. 
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considered as the AMOCO's biggest ever discovery. The 
Sajaa field is Supposed to have a potential of several 
trillion cubic feet of gas and hundreds of millions of 
barrels of recoverable condensate. Now the low condensate 
production is approximately 32/000 b/d where as gas 
3 
product ion i s approximately 388 mn f t / d . All the gas 
goes t o t he LPG p l an t i n t h e e m i r a t e . 
The p l an t produces propane, butane and condensates . 
54% of t he dry gas goes t o Dubai ' s JebeDL Ali power s t a t i o n 
and t h e remaining 4.6% t o Emirates General Petroleum 
Corporation (EGPC). EGPC has l a i d down p i p e l i n e s for the 
c a r r i a g e of t h i s gas t o power s t a t i o n s in o the r nor thern 
e m i r a t e s . 
Ras-al-Khaimah; 
A group led by V i to l of Nether lands and Weeks 
Petroleum of Canada got the concession in 1973. In 1976, 
t he Ras-al-Khaimah B-1 well (REK Bl) y ie lded 4000 b /d of 
o i l and in 1977, REXA 1 y ie lded 2,750 b /d of 44°API crude 
o i l and 17 mi l l i on cubic f ee t /day of n a t u r a l gas . In 1978, 
t he REKA 2 we l l , d r i l l e d by Zapata Oil on behalf of t he 
permit ho lde r s , was abandoned as a dry h o l e . 
In 1978, Gulf Oil of t he US concluded an explora t ion 
agreement covering t h e e m i r a t e ' s e n t i r e onshore area and 
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s t a r t e d d r i l l i n g o p e r a t i o n s t h e same y e a r . 
During t h e summer of 1981, t h e Government of Ras-
al -Khaimah awarded an o f f s h o r e e x p l o r a t i o n a c e r a g e t o a 
group of companies l e d by Gulf O i l , a s t h e t h e o p e r a t o r 
29 
company w i t h 37,5% s h a r e s 
I n 1978 an amendment of t h e law r e l a t i n g t o income 
t a x of o i l companies a u t h o r i s e d such companies o p e r a t i n g 
i n Ras-a l -Khaimah t o u s e p r o f i t s of one b ranch of a c t i -
v i t i e s t o compensate f o r d e f i c i t s of a n o t h e r b r a n c h . 
P r e v i o u s l y each b r a n c h of a c t i v i t i e s was s u b j e c t t o 
t a x a t i o n s e p a r a t e l y . T h i s a l s o a l l o w s t h o s e companies t o 
r e q u e s t t a x exempt ion i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t a x e s e v e n -
t u a l l y p a y a b l e by them abroad on t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s i n 
Ras -a l -Kha imah . 
Towards t h e end of 1981, an o f f s h o r e e x p l o r a t i o n 
was g r a n t e d t o a conso r t i um of companies l e d by Gulf O i l . 
T h i s consor t ium was t o d r i l l two w e l l s by 1982. L a t e r 
Windsor wi thdrew and t h e o t h e r p a r t n e r s enhanced t h e i r 
s t a k e s . I n 1985, Gulf O i l was p u r c h a s e d by Chevron and 
s u b s e q u e n t l y s o l d i t s s h a r e i n t h e conces s ion i n 1987 t o : 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l P e t r o l e u m , Opic and W i n t e r s h a l l , I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
P e t r o l e u m (IP) bagged an onshore c o n c e s s i o n w i t h t h e 
29 . "Arab O i l & Gas D i r e c t o r y " ; The Arab Pe t ro l eum 
Research C e n t r e ( F r a n c e ) ; p p . 405-406 , 1982. 
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Table 2-»5 
Share Composition of Different Companies in Gulf 
Oil ConsortJTjmn 
Companies % Share Composition 
Gulf Oil 37.5 
International petroleum 
of Canada 22.5 
Windsor Resources (Canada) 17.5 
Opic (Taiwan) 17.5 
Pe t roka l 5.0 
Source: Economic I n t e l l i g e n c e Unit» Country P r o f i l e 
UAE; p . 25, 19 88-89. 
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emirate in l9S7. By mid 1988, US Phillips Petroleum Cor-
poration and Swedish Petroleum Exploration Corporation 
acquired 50% and 7% interests respectively in the conce-
ssion/ thus reducing I.P•s share to only 43%. Saleh field 
was discovered in 1985 and its production in 1989 was 
approximately lOOO b/d. In 1986, a LPG plant with a 
capacity of 1000 b/d was set up to market its produce to 
30 Japan 
Fujairah, Umm-al-Ualwaln and Ajman : 
Various companies are s t i l l conducting seismic/ 
geodetic and mineral surveys in these three emirates but 
yet no significant and commercially viable discovery has 
been reported. 
30. op . c i t . , p . 67, 
CHAPTER - I I I 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN UAE 
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The discovery of oil and its export, to the world 
markets has restructured the economic and social fabric 
of the coxintry. The continuous flow of oil revenues to 
the economy v;ith a steady increase has made UAE a capital 
surplus economy. These accumulated funds have opened 
the door for investments. The volume/ quantum and nature 
of relationships that prevailed between various produc-
tive sectors of the economy have undergone a significant 
change. The oil wealth has, therefore, initiated the 
process of economic development in the Emirates. 
A sectorwise break up of the GDP data reveals 
that maximum contribution to the GDP both in absolute 
and percentage terms has been from the crude oil sector. 
The GDP of the country at factor cost, when viewed in 
respect to the movement in oil prices reveals that there 
exists a directly proportional relationship between 
the GDP and oil prices. A comparison of the two shows 
that whenever the oil prices have soared up so has the 
GDP increased. Also except for 1981 whenever the per-
centage contribution by oil sector in the GDP has 
increased so has the total GDP increased. It is interes-
ting to note that the oil prices have had direct relation-
ship with the oil sectors contribution to GDP in parti-
cular and the GDP in general. 
7l 
In 1971, when federation was achieved, the atti-
tude in the V.'est shifted to one of pessimism regarding 
its continued existence. It is worthwhile recalling the 
hurried arrangements which led to the birth of the UAE 
following the abrupt 1968 announcement of British with-
drawal after 150 years of almost total control. Barely 
a month later the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai announced 
their intention to form a federation under one flag, 
with joint foreign policy, defence and citizenship and 
invited other Gulf states to join. 
From 1820 to 197l, when Britain pulled out of 
the Gulf area, it was the strongest power in the region, 
and as such kept the Trucial States in almost total 
isolation until the early 1950s. Its main interest, of 
course, had been to safegaurd the route to India, and 
it was not. concerned with local conditions. The sub-
sistence economy of most of the emirates began to be 
eased only when oil was discovered in Abu Dhabi in 
1958. The development process is, therefore, barely 30 
years old. Despite fears of the catastrophes v/hich would 
be caused bythe "vaccum" created by Britain's departure 
in 1971, the UAE has neither collapsed internally, nor 
been overrun by the forces of any other power. However, 
major moves tov/ards greater cohesion were the creation 
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in l a t e 1980 of the UAE Central Bank and t h e concomitant 
support t o t he federa l budget from Abu Dhabi and Dubai, 
t h e major o i l producing emira tes . 
The UAE's most important foreign r e l a t i o n s h i p 
a f t e r t h a t with B r i t a i n , has been with Saudi Arabia. An 
important element of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p has been the 
d e f i n i t i o n of t h e i r mutual borders a f t e r the o i l companies 
made t h e i r en t ry i n t o Arabia in the 1930s. The Burairai 
c r i s i s of t he 1950s a d i spu te about sovereignty over an 
o a s i s / which placed a great s t r a i n on Saudi-Abu Dhabi 
r e l a t i o n s was f i n a l l y resolved in 1976 when Saudi Arabia 
was given a "window" in t he Gulf a t Ras Khumays in 
exchange for t h e renuncia t ion of i t s claims t o Buraimi, 
near Al-Aih, l60 k i lomete rs from Abu Dhabi . Saudi 
inf luence cont inues t o be strong and l i k e o ther Gulf 
s t a t e s , the UAE follows Saudi Arabias lead in foreign 
a f f a i r s . 
Since t he soc ie ty of t h e UAE cont inues t o under-
go dramatic and rapid changes, i t s future i s being 
formed even a t t h i s very moment. T i l l t he p r e - o i l e ra , 
i t was one of the poores t Arab c o u n t r i e s , i t s people 
having suffered tremendous economic hardships a f t e r the 
1. MEED, Special Report, p. 2,1981. 
2. MEED, :oaV (31), 31, 1980. 
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co l lapse of t he p e a r l i n g indus t ry / for long t h e i r f inan-
c i a l miiinstay. Today, o i l has given i t s c i t i z e n s one of 
t he h ighes t per cap i t a incomes in the world. The 1980 
budget v;as of t h e amount of US $ 4,314 m i l l i o n , roughly 
25% of which - US $ 1,161 mi l l i on v/as a l l o c a t e d to socia l 
s e rv i ces covering educat ion, h e a l t h , housing, e l e c t r i c i t y 
and water . Defence and i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y accounted for 
around 36% (US $ 1,588 mi l l ion) of t he budget"^. The 1988 
budget had been forecas ted at US $ 3,884 m i l l i o n . 
Such an ex t rao rd ina ry t r a n s i t i o n i s r e f l e c t ed 
in t h e p r o v i s i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . Signed in Dubai on 
18 Ju ly 1971 by t h e s ix i nd iv idua l r u l e r s (Ras-al-Khaimah 
jo ined t h e UAE in February 1972), i t forms t h e b a s i s of 
t h e p o l i t i c a l , j u d i c i a l , soc i a l and economic organiza-
t i o n of t he country . Apart from gran t ing veto r i g h t s t o 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the Supreme Council (made up of 
t he seven r u l e r s ) , t h e p rov i s iona l c o n s t i t u t i o n had two 
o the r a r t i c l e s worth no t i ng . A r t i c l e 23 s p e c i f i c a l l y 
s t a t e d t h a t the n a t u r a l wealth and resources of each 
emirate would be t h e pub l i c p roper ty of t h a t emi ra t e . 
This a r t i c l e au tomat ica l ly set t he poor apar t from the 
r i ch and i s a c l e a r obs tac l e t o f u l l economic i n t e g r a t i o n 
A r t i c l e 69, which s e t s out t h e general condi t ions for 
3 . I b i d . , p . 35 . 
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the advisory assembly, t^e Federal National Council 
(FNC), stated that each emirate was to select rather 
than elect its representatives. The constitution was 
superimposed on the traditional society of the UAE. 
The President, Supreme Council of Rulers and the 
Council of Ministers (cabinet) exist today alongside 
the political order of the past: each ruler's majlis 
(meeting with subjects) continues to be held daily, 
and it is still the best place for personal contact 
betv;een the ruler and his people. The two systems co-
exist, but rapid social and economic chances are 
eroding the functional sphere of influence of the 
majlis. 
The citizens of UAE are outniimbered by foreigners 
who comprise 75% to 85% of the population. It can of 
course be argued that certain parts of the UAE have 
traditionally had large nvimbers of foreigners; at 
the turn of the century, for example, Dubai alone had a 
4 
50% non-native population . But the ratio has increased 
alarmingly during the past few years as a result of the 
importation of Asian workers for vast development 
projects, and many have remained illegaly. The enact-
ment of new labour laws to restrict casual labour v;ill 
go some way to alleviate the crisis. But the immigrants 
4. MEED, XXIV (29), 45, 1980. 
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are arriving because of specific demands for their services-
demands made by the country Is social and development policies-
Social policies call for the construction, establishment 
and running of schools, hospitals and recreational centres, 
all of which depend heavily on foreign labour. Industrial 
development at Ruwais 100 miles west of Abu Dhabi, Jebel 
Ali outside Dubai and the Dubai Drydock also calls for 
5 
foreign firms and foreign labour . But the foreign labour 
that is being imported also requires social infrastructure, 
which in turn calls for more foreign labour. 
The planning and execution of social and industrial 
programmes are dependent on foreign firms and technology. 
The decision-making powers of individual rulers are thus 
considerably curtailed, and the role of new federal insti-
tutions short circuited. The annual and virtually unlimited 
supply of money enables the UAE to afford mistakes, for 
oil vyealth will continue to serve as a shock absorber for 
some time to come. Their may be an opinion to select 
such projects which would enhance the development of 
national manpower, yet it is a difficult proposition for 
UAE to become independent of the expatriate labour force. 
UAE crude oil production was reduced in 1981 to 
1,5 million barrels a day (b/d) compared with 1.7 million b/d 
5. MEED, Special Report, p. 5, 1980. 
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in 1980 i . e . a reduc t ion of 11.7% and i t continued t o dec-
l i n e upto 1986 and then again increased by 8.3% in 1987 
and by 5.8% in 1988 but the emira tes remain a s i g n i f i c a n t 
producer (See t a b l e 2.1 in chapter 2 ) . An a n a l y s i s of 
t he o i l product ion data shows t h a t Abu Dhabi accounts for 
t h e highest product ion with an a l l time high of 79.4% 
of o i l product ion coming from Abu Dhabi in 1980. In Sharjah 
product ion had decl ined t o i n s i g n i f i c a n t volumes in ea r ly 
1980s. I t has a promising hydrocarbons find being developed 
by AMOCO Sharjah O i l . 
Oil vjealth has fue l led a major investment procramm.'^  . 
The 1.6 mi l l ion popula t ion i s concentra ted in the urban 
cen t r e s of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah with smaller 
concen t ra t ions in the emira tes of Umm-al-Qaiwain, Ajm.an 
and Ras-al-Khaimah. The p lanners have not forgot ten the 
needs of the poorer nor thern e m i r a t e s . The F i r s t Five Year 
Plan submitted in 1981 Was d ra f t ed t o broaden the economic 
base and gradual ly reduce dependence on o i l . Investment 
in a g r i c u l t u r e and indus t ry were assigned p r i o r i t i e s . 
The p lans o the r aims were conservat ion of petroleum, 
resources , food s e c u r i t y , p r e s e r v a t i o n of t h e environment 
7 
and prudent investment overseas . 
6. "The Middle East and North Afr ica" . Europe P u b l i c a t i o n s , 
London (U.K.); e d n . 3 3 , p . 844 , 1987. 
7 . MEED, XXV ( 1 6 ) , 5 4 , 1 9 8 1 . 
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In the f i r s t 10 years of the federa t ion pr ior i ty-
was cjiven t o the development of ba s i c i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , 
both economic and s o c i a l . Large p r o j e c t s a lso had t o be 
unuertaken in the o i l s ec to r t o co r rec t problems from 
the rapid e x p l o i t a t i o n in t h e l a t e 1960s of crude o i l 
resources in Abu Dhabi. Major investments were m.ade by 
the Abu Dhabi and Dubai governments, p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r 
Q 
1970 v;hen Dubai exported oil for the first time . 
In the late 1970s the UAr: weathered a recession 
which followed the 1974-77 boom when rising oil prices 
rapidly increased revenues. This recession v;as not en 
account of capital surplus as these surplus funds could 
not find a channel for investment v.'hich suggests that 
the absorptive capacity of the UAE economy was severely 
constrained. As economic growth accelerated, supply 
bottlenecks caused excess demand in the economy. Domestic 
inflation rose to about 30% in 1974-77. A large influx 
of immigrant labour - some of it arriving stealthily 
under the dark cover of night on the scenic coastline of 
the Gulf of Oman - placed stress on the supply of housing 
and accomodation. In 1968 UAE nationals then comprised 
about 90% of the population; by 1973 the proportion had 
8. MEED, Special Report, p. 4, 198l 
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dropped to 50% and by 1980 to about 27%. Now the nationals 
9 
comprise 15% - 25% of t h e t o t a l popula t ion , From amongst 
the e x p a t r i a t e workers, by fa r the most are u n s k i l l e d 
l aboure r s on cons t ruc t ion s i t e s . Government po l i cy has 
curbed the growth of e x p a t r i a t e manpower since 19 77 but 
as mentioned e a r l i e r t h e replacement of e x p a t r i a t e s by 
n a t i o n a l s i s a goal t h a t may not be achieved in concievable 
f u t u r e . 
The UAE Currency Board was se t up in May 1973 t o 
manage the f e d e r a t i o n ' s currency and t o develop i n to a 
c e n t r a l bank. This came i n to e f f ec t from December 15, 
1980. The bank was made rejsponsible for c o n t r o l l i n g 
c r e d i t po l i cy with the aim of fo s t e r ing balanced na t iona l 
economic growth. I t was charged with advis ing the govern-
ment on monetary and f i nanc i a l i s s u e s , i s su ing currency, 
maintaining gold and foreign currency reseirves and cont ro-
l l i n g the banking s e c t o r . In add i t ion t o p lac ing dirham 
depos i t s and budget c o n t r i b u t i o n s with the Central Bank, 
without i n t e r e s t , the federa l government was requi red t o 
make a permanent depos i t of $ 2 bn or i t s equivalent in 
foreign c u r r e n c i e s . This depos i t was t o be increased by 
20% a year u n t i l i t reached $ 4 bn. 
9 . MERI Report -• UAc/Univ. Pennsylvania , Croom Helm, 
London (u,K*), pT 4 , 1985. 
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In the event , the Central Bank has had a s i g n i f i -
cant impact on banking in t he UAE since the s t a r t of the 
1980s, although i t s t i l l has only as much or as l i t t l e 
power as the ind iv idua l emira tes and t h e i r ru l ing faTiilies 
are prepared t o give i t . I t has t r i e d with only l imi ted 
success to con t ro l the opening of branches , c a p i t a l / 
a s s e t s r a t i o s , loans t o d i r e c t o r s , d i s c l o s u r e of balance 
shee ts and so on. S imi la r ly , i t s pov;erc of persuas ion 
with regard t o mergers among the UAE's numerous commer-
c i a l banks have not been as grea t as those of the govern-
ments of ind iv idua l e m i r a t e s . The mergers t h a t took place 
in Abu Dhabi and Dubai in 19 85 were l a r g e l y t he work of 
Abu Dhabi end Dubai governments, s ince i t was they who 
put up t he necessary funds, VJhen the Ras-al-Khaimah 
government f a i l e d t o provide the funds needed t o rescue 
a t roub led Ras-al-Khaimah bank in 1985, the Central Bank 
was unable to i n t e r v e n e . One of the bank ' s main problem 
at t he moment i s t o persuade Abu Dhabi and Dubai - as t h e 
we igh t i e s t members of the federa t ion - t o accept a federal 
pub l i c debt law. Viewed by the emira tes as an infringement 
of t h e i r independence of ac t ion , such a law would never-
t h e l e s s give a federal b a s i s t o t he financing of the 
federa l d e f i c i t which the bank i s anxious t o ach ieve . 
The bank issued $ 1.75 bn worth of c e r t i f i c a t e s of deoosi t 
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during 1987 . More important as a guarantee of t he i n s t i -
t u t i o n ' s success i s the comniitment by Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
t o p lace hal f of t h e i r fu ture o i l revenues with the bank. 
The UAE has a l so made a major t h r u s t t o develop 
an i n d u s t r i a l b a s e . Some of t he most impressive r e s u l t s 
have a l so been the most modest: Ras-al-Khaimah has e s t ab -
l i s h e d a v i a b l e heavy i n d u s t r i a l zone based on export of 
aggregate and cement. J a p a n ' s Ishikawa-jima-Harima Heavy 
I n d u s t r i e s , which b u i l t t h e cement works, desc r ibes the 
cement "unreservedly" as some of t he bes t produced in the 
Gulf. The b igges t s ing le investment i s Abu Dhabi ' s massive 
Ruwais i n d u s t r i a l zone 250 k i lomete rs from the c a p i t a l at 
t he former o i l export t e rmina l of Jebe l Dhanna. The next 
p r o j e c t i s the I t a l i a n - b u i l t 120,000 b /d o i l r e f ine ry t o 
supply domestic needs . The Abu Dhabi Onshore Gas p ro jec t 
(GASCO) expor t s l i q u i f i e d petroleum gas (LPG) t o Japan, 
and work on an ammonia and urea complex t o be owned by 
Abu Dhabi and F rance ' s s t a t e owned Compagnic Francaise 
des P e t r o l e s (CFP-Total) was s t a r t e d by a Japanese 
company. Dubai ' s complementary p ro j ec t t o Ruwais i s 
Jebe l Ali i n d u s t r i a l zone southwest of t h e c i t y . The 
Dubai Aluminium (DUBAL) smel ter i s a base p r o j e c t a t 
Jebe l Ali and i s r epo r t i ng s t rong expor t s . In .ear ly 1981 
10. Economic I n t e l l i g e n c e t3nji,t« Country P r o f i l e " UAE? 
p . 35, 1988-89. 
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t h e r e was every sign of Dubai ' s renewed commitment t o 
Jebe l A l i : Sheikh Rashid tou red t h e area and ordered an 
ea r ly s t a r t on a new town t o serve t h e p o r t . The sheikh 
showed h i s f a i t h in h i s UK adv i se r s by commissioning 
Halcrow I n t e r n a t i o n a l P a r t n e r s h i p as c o n s u l t a n t s for the 
11 
re-al ignment of Dubai t o Abu Dhabi road 
Manufactur ing 's t o t a l con t r ibu t ion t o gross domestic 
product (GDP) i s small , but i t has s t e a d i l y r i s e n from 
3.5% in 1978 t o 10.68% in 1987 (see t a b l e 3 . 3 ) . The cl imate 
for j o i n t ven tu res between UAE and European or Japanese 
p a r t n e r s i s encouraging. Of f i c i a l funds are ava i l ab l e for 
12 UAE n a t i o n a l s t o borrow t o f inance produc t ive e n t e r p r i s e s . 
The UAE remains overwhelmingly dependent on the 
e x t r a c t i o n , p rocess ing and sa le of hydrocarbons. This 
w i l l i n e v i t a b l y continue t o be the case for the foreseeable 
f u t u r e . Independent e s t ima te s put t h e combined rese rves of 
crude o i l in the seven emi ra tes a t about 50,000 mi l l ion 
b a r r e l s . However, UAE o f f i c i a l s claim the ac tua l amount 
13 may be as twice t h i s l e v e l . Such f igures suggest t h a t 
t h e country may comfortably r e ly on t h e proceeds of o i l 
s a l e s coupled with j u d i c i o u s deployment of i t s f i nanc ia l 
r e s e r v e s . This approach has not gained any currency in 
view of t h e po l i cy aimed a t developing a d i v e r s i f i e d 
11. MEED, XXV(23), 44, 1981. 
12. op . cit., p«7'7. 
13. MEED, Special Report, p. 2, 1988. 
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economy of fe r ing meaningful job o p p o r t u n i t i e s for young 
UAE n a t i o n a l s . The main problems encountered by t h i s 
s t r a t e g y are the small s i ze of t h e economically a c t i v e 
na t iona l labour force and l im i t ed sphere of the l oca l 
market . 
Lack of s k i l l e d labour and t r a i n e d manpower have 
continued t o a t t r a c t personnel for white c o l l a r jobs from 
Europe and North Africa and blue c o l l a r and manual workers 
from the Indian sub -con t inen t . With t he given pace of 
development, the UAE s h a l l cont inue t o depend upon the 
e x p a t r i a t e manpower. A mani fes t a t ion of t he government's 
consciousness t o replace fore ign labour by n a t i v e s are 
i t s se r ious e f f o r t s t o educate the UAE n a t i o n a l s . This 
educated and t r a i n e d cadre i s expected t o replace foreign 
execu t ive , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and t e c h n i c a l s t a f f . S i g n i f i -
cant p rog res s has been made in t h e p u b l i c sec to r but 
p r i v a t e indus t ry i s mostly s t a f f ed with e x p a t r i a t e 
workers . 
Transpor t f a c i l i t i e s b u i l t in t h e 1970s and 1980s 
are being geared t o s a t i s f y t h e needs of r eg iona l and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l markets . Por t Rashid - t h e most a c t i v e of 
Dubai ' s two p o r t s i s now t h e second b u s i e s t in t h e Arabian 
peninsu la a f t e r Jeddah I s l amic Poirt, mainly as t h e r e s u l t 
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of v/tnning a huge amount of transhipment b u s i n e s s . The UAE's 
s ix i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i r p o r t s are being used t o promote the 
sea or a i r cargo de l ive ry system for s u p p l i e r s de l ive r ing 
goods from Europe t o t he Far Eas t . Ind iv idua l emira tes 
have developed t h e i r own reg iona l s t r a t e g i e s . Most remar-
kable i s Dubai. Dubai ' s Jebe l Ali Free Zone Authority 
(JAF2A) has emerged as an important cen t re for manufacturers 
producing goods for sa le worldwide. Late ly t e x t i l e expor ts 
from JAFZA have pene t r a t ed markets in North America. The 
emergence in the 1980s of a f ree t r a d e area encompassing 
a l l s ix Gulf Cooperation Council s t a t e s o f f e r s fu r the r 
encouraging p rospec t s for t h e UAE's p r i v a t e s e c t o r . I t s 
p r i v i l e g e d access t o a market of more than 10 mi l l ion high-
income people provides a range of a t t r a c t i v e bus iness 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s . 
An a n a l y s i s of t h e o i l revenue da ta (see t ab l e 1.4 
in chapter 1) r evea l s t h a t from 19 70-19 87/ petroleum 
export revenues have accounted for 85.72% of t o t a l expor ts 
and are t he source of t h e bu lk revenues for the federa t ion 
and t h e t h r e e energy expor t ing emi ra t e s . This c l e a r l y 
impl ies lack of d i v e r s i t y of the economy. The UAE paid 
dear for t h i s dependence when export earn ings of t h e 
petroleum sec to r in p a r t i c u l a r and t h a t of t h e t o t a l 
export.s in general f e i l by 36.35% and 31.39% re spec t i ve ly 
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during the o i l p r i c e crash in 1986. However, even during 
t h i s lean per iod of o i l markets , the petroleum expor ts 
con t r ibu ted 74.1% t o t h e t o t a l expor t s of t h e economy. 
Conscious of t he v u l n e r a b i l i t y of t h e economy, e f f o r t s 
have been made t o d i v e r s i f y . There has been a surge of 
i n t e r e s t in manufacturing which mostly makes use of 
n a t u r a l gas and a l l emira tes are seeking t o develop 
tourism as a major indust iry. 
In t h i s s t r i d e for d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n se r ious e f f o r t s 
are being made in t he d i r e c t i o n of r e - e x p o r t s . As mentioned 
e a r l i e r Dubai has taken a lead in t h i s arena and bes ides 
JAFZA, Por t Rashid of Dubai has emerged as a very ac t i ve 
transhipment cen t re in the Arabian p e n i n s u l a . The success 
of such i n i t i a t i v e s depends on the e f f i c i ency of UAE p o r t s 
and the cont inua t ion of r e s t r i c t i v e p o l i c i e s in o ther Gulf 
economies. Despite t h e o i l p r i c e c rash , t h e UAE was s t i l l 
in a s trong f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n . The cur rent account was 
roughly in balance in 1986, but has s ince moved back 
s t rongly i n t o s u r p l u s . The UAE surplus was forecas ted t o 
t o t a l US $ 2350 mi l l i on approximately in 1989. Abu Dhabi 
i s es t imated t o have more than US $ 20,000 mi l l i on and 
Abu Dhabi Investment Author i ty (ADIA) has shareholdings 
in a range of i n t e r n a t i o n a l companies. Some a n a l y s t s 
be l i eve t h a t in near fu ture Abu Dhabi ' s income from rese rves 
sha l l exceed o i l revenues . 
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T a b l e 3 .1 
UAE; Ba lance of Payments(1985-89) 
(Thousand m i l l i o n d o l l a r s ) 
1985 1986 1987 1988-^ 1989^ 
Expor r s 13.28 7.89 10.32 8 .71 10.35 
I m p o r t s 6.97 6.73 7 .36 7 .48 7 .58 
Net t r a n s f e r s - 1 . 2 4 - 1 . 2 3 - 0.85 • - 1 . 2 3 - 0 . 4 3 
C u r r e n t Account 
Ba lance +5 .07 - 0 , 0 7 +2 .12 +0.42 +2.35 
Sourcet MEED, S p e c i a l R e p o r t , p . 5, 1989, 
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T a b l e 3.4 
Average P e r c e n t a g e C o n t r i b u t i o n of D i f f e r e n t S e c t o r s 
t o GDP (1978-1987) 
S e c t o r s P e r c e n t a g e RanKs 
C o n t r i b u t i o n 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
T r a n s p o r t & communicat ion 4 .25 7 
Power & w a t e r 1.76 8 
Othe r s e r v i c e s 1.46 9 
A g r i c u l t u r e , l i v e s t o c k 
6c f i s h i n g 1.19 10 
Mining & q u a r r y i n g 
o t h e r t h a n crude o i l 0,24 11 
I n d i r e c t t a x e s & 
s u b s i d i e s - 1 . 8 8 12 
Source : Computed on t h e b a s i s of c o m p u t a t i o n s made i n 
Crude o i l 
Construct ion 
Government s e rv i ce s 
Trade 
Finance, insurance & 
r e a l e s t a t e 
Manufacturing 
48.97 
10.17 
9.56 
9.47 
7.69 
7.50 
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Tab le 3.5 
Crude Oi l P r i c e s i n UAE (1971-1987) 
( D o l l a r s p e r b a r r e l ; 
•:i:ear P r i c e of I'mrban % change i n P r i c e s 
1971 2.34 
1972 2.54 +8.5 
1973 6 .11 +140.5 
1974 11.37 *86.0 
1975 11 .91 +4.7 
1976 
1977 13.26 
1978 
1979 14.10 
1980 33 .56 +138.0 
1981 35 .70 +6 .3 
1982 34 .56 - 3 . 1 
1983 29.56 - 1 4 . 4 
19 84 
1985 28.15 
1986 15.55 (8.45-'-) _44 .7 (-69 .g-"") 
1987 17.92 +15.2 
Source : CP£C Annual S t a t i .dt-.i r a l Ru1]ft.j,p. OPEC S e c r e t a r i a t , 
Vienna ( A u s t r i a ) ; p p . 128-130, 1987. 
1 In 1986 t h e l owes t p r i c e was $ 8,45A> on J u l y l , 1986; 
c a l c u l a t e d a t t h i s p r i c e t h e p e r c e n t a g e d i f f e r e n c e comes 
t o be -69 .9% a s a g a i n s t -44 .7% c a l c u l a t e d a t $ 15.55A>« 
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The o i l p r i c e s inc reased in 1979 and again in 1980 
(see t a b l e 3 , 5 ) . This i nc rease in o i l p r i c e s led t o 
enormous i nc r ea se s in o i l revenues (see t a b l e 1.4 in 
chapter l) though the q u a n t i t y of o i l produced did not 
inc rease r a t h e r decreased (see t a b l e 2.1 in chapter 2 ) . 
This inc rease in o i l revenues generated a massive increase 
in government spending, which even tua l ly t r a n s l a t e d i n to 
rapid GDP growth. 
Oil and gas s e c t o r s con t r ibu t ion t o GDP decl ined 
over t h e years from 1974. I t r e g i s t e r e d a con t r ibu t ion of 
54.3% in 1978. But with l a rge o i l p r i c e h ikes in 1979, 
t h e o i l share in GDP increased t o 60.2%. I t rose fu r the r 
t o 64.5% in 1980 as o i l p r i c e s continued t o r i s e , but 
dropped back t o 59.14% in 1981 as revenues decl ined from 
US $ 19/558 mi l l ion in 1980 t o US $ 18,815 mi l l ion in 1981 
though t h e p r i c e had increased from US $ 33.56/b in 198C 
to us $ 35.7/b in l98l but t h e product ion decl ined from 
1,701.9 thousand b /d in 1980 t o 1,502.3 thousand b/d in 
1981 i . e . product ion dec l ined by 11.7%. O i l ' s share of the 
GDP stood at 4 8.65% in 19 82 due t o a dec l ine in a l l t he 
t h r e e f ac to r s v i z product ion , p r i c e and o i l revenues by 
16.9%, 3.1% and 18.4% r e s p e c t i v e l y . This dec l ine in o i l ' s 
share t o GDP continued in 19 83 . I t fu r the r s l i d down t o 
9 1 
43.81% because once again t h e r e was a f a l l in product ion, 
p r i c e s and revenues by 8%, 14.4% and 20.2% r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
In 1986, o i l ' s share t o GDP increased t o 46.27% though 
the product ion dec l ined 'by 7% yet t he o i l export revenues 
increased by 6%. This sugges ts t h a t perhaps t h e r e was an 
inc rease in o i l p r i c e s or the quan t i t y of ref ined o i l 
exported was i nc reased . In 1985 yet again t he o i l s e c t o r ' s 
share t o GDP decreased t o 43.78%, The product ion of o i l 
decl ined by 1.1% and the revenues by 9% whereas the p r i c e 
stood at US $ 28 .15 /b . In 1986, t h e o i l s e c t o r s con t r ibu t ion 
t o t h e GDP reached an a l l time low of 32.4 6% and the t o t a l 
GDP of the country a l so took a nose dive t o Dh 80.7 bn i . e . 
a downfall of 20.95% approximately as compared t o the 
previous yea r . Such a b leak s i t u a t i o n had a r i s en due t o 
the fact t ha t t he global o i l market had crashed miserably 
in 19 86. Not only UAE but t he e n t i r e OPEC had suffered a 
se r ious setback in t h i s yea r . The o i l p r i c e had decl ined 
t o US $ IS.SSA) as aga ins t US $ 28 . ISA in 1985. This 
meant a d r a s t i c decrease of 44.7% in the p r i c e . At one 
time i . e . on Ju ly I, 19 86 t h e p r i c e went down upto us $ 
8.45A5 thus r e g i s t e r i n g a downfall of 69.9% which has 
c rea ted h i s t o r y . During t h i s per iod the o i l production 
and revenues s t eep ly f e l l by 23.9% and 36.3% r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
In 1987, the o i l and gas con t r i bu t ion t o GDP rose t o 3 6.59%. 
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A conjecture may be drawn t h a t t h i s had become pos s ib l e 
due to an inc rease in p r i c e s by 15.2%,that in production 
by 8.3% and revenues by 16.1%, The year 19 87, a l so saw 
an increase of 9.04% approximately in t he t o t a l GDP of 
t h e economy of UAE which was l i t e r a l l y shaken due t o the 
crash in o i l p r i c e s . 
The above study suggests t ha t how vulnerable an 
economy i s t o exogeneous and endogeneous p r e s su re s i f i t 
has s ing le lead sec to r in i t s economy on which i t s GDP 
depends t o a s i g n i f i c a n t p ropor t ion of 4 0% - 50%. This 
a l so p o i n t s t o t h e neces s i ty for the d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of 
an economy. 
The l a r g e s t non-o i l s ec to r has been cons t ruc t ion . 
I t ranks second as regards con t r ibu t ion t o GDP (see t a b l e 
3.4 in t h i s c h a p t e r ) . I t ' s share of GDP has however 
dwindled as l a rge p r o j e c t s were completed and a u s t e r i t y 
measures coupled with t h e economic slowdown reduced the 
demand for cons t ruc t ion s e r v i c e s . I t s average percentage 
con t r i bu t ion t o t he GDP for t he per iod 1978-87 has been 
10.17%. 
In t h e order of h i e r a r chy , t he t h i r d l a r g e s t 
c o n t r i b u t o r t o GDP i s the govt ser-vices s e c t o r . The share 
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of government se rv ices has considerably increased from 
6.5% in 1978 t o 15.11% in 1987. I t s average percentage 
share over t he per iod 1978-87 has stood at 9.5 6%. 
Trade has been another major con t r i bu to r t o GDP, 
a f ac to r which can be a t t r i b u t e d t o t he o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
t h i s s ec to r p r e s e n t s in a r ap id ly growing economy and 
the commercial t r a d i t i o n s of the loca l popu la t i on . I t s 
con t r ibu t ion t o GDP has increased from 9.16% in 1978 t o 
11.25% in 1987, though i t has not been a pe r f ec t s t r a i g h t 
l i n e . I t s average con t r i bu t ion t o the GDP for the per iod 
1978-87 has been 9.47%. 
The se rv ice s ec to r has progressed q u i t e we l l , 
s p e c i a l l y f inance , insurance and r ea l e s t a t e . The average 
percentage con t r ibu t ion by f inance, insurance and r ea l 
e s t a t e t o t h e GDP for t h e per iod in 1978-87 has been 
7.69%. Real e s t a t e i s a s i g n i f i c a n t growing sec to r , 
accounting for 4.22% for t h e pe r iod 1978-82. I t s rapid 
growth cannot be a t t r i b u t e d t o an inc rease in production 
but only t o inc reas ing r e n t s and proper ty v a l u e s . Besides 
the cons t ruc t ion mini-boom has been p a r t l y fue l led by 
increased l o c a l p r i v a t e investment in land and p roper ty , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y f l a t s and o f f i c e s . Rents have r i s en sharply . 
In 19 88, in a few months span t h e r e n t s had shot up by 
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15% - 20% in December. The boom has helped t h e loca l cement 
i ndus t ry , as t he inc rease in cons t ruc t ion has pushed up 
14 
the p r i c e of cement and o the r bu i ld ing m a t e r i a l s . The 
rea l e s t a t e sector has developed because of a high r i s e in 
t he cons t ruc t ion sec to r / because cons t ruc t ion and rea l 
e s t a t e always move in the same d i r e c t i o n . Moreover real 
e s t a t e s e c t o r p rogresses only when t h e i r i s aff luence in 
the economy or extreme popula t ion p r e s s u r e . The development 
of the cons t ruc t ion sec to r promotes a n c i l l i a r y i n d u s t r i e s 
of cons t ruc t ion items and t hus t h e i r i s cascading effect 
on the economy. I t has been even observed above t h a t t h i s 
has promoted cement and o the r bu i ld ing m a t e r i a l s i n d u s t r i e s , 
No doubt i t has promoted the cement i n d u s t r y , but the back-
bone of any cons t ruc t ion i s i ron and s t e e l as i t i s a 
very important bu i ld ing c o n s t i t u e n t / so i t impl ies huge 
amount of foreign exchange i s spent on the import of 
i ron and s t e e l as UAE does not possess any depos i t s of 
i ron o r e . Moreover t he power and water sec to r has moved 
with a s n a l e ' s pace . This fu r the r p o i n t s t o t h e fact t h a t 
much of i n d u s t r i e s have not been developed, t h e r e f o r e 
whatsoever t h e p rogress in power and water sec to r has 
mainly ca te red t o the domestic cons\amption. Therefore t he 
cons t ruc t ion sec to r has provided for f l a t s , shopping 
arcades and of f ice complexes and not for i n d u s t r i e s . 
14. I b i d . / p . 9. 
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Therefore i t may be fu r t he r sa id t h a t import of i ron and 
s t e e l i s for the cons t ruc t ion of luxur ious houses and 
p r e s t i g i o u s b u i l d i n g s which may be termed as conspicuous 
consumption as t h i s does not br ing about any p o s i t i v e 
s t r u c t u r a l change in the economy. 
The manufacturing s ec to r has r e g i s t e r e d a f a i r 
degree of grovv-th. Most of t he growth has been in the 
heavy i n d u s t r i e s . The government has placed grea t 
emphasis on i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n but s t i l l much remains t o 
be done on t h i s f r o n t . These i n d u s t r i e s are hydrocarbon 
l inked , and dependent on o i l and gas . The con t r ibu t ion 
of manufacturing sec tor t o t h e GDP has r i s e n from 3.5% 
in 1978 to 10.68% in 1987. I t s average percentage c o n t r i -
but ion t o t h e GDP over t h e per iod 1978-87 has been 7.5%. 
Transport and communications con t r ibu t ion t o the GDP for 
the per iod 1978-87 has been only 4.25%. 
F i n a l l y , t he a g r i c u l t u r e s ec to r has not shown 
any s i zeab le improvement, though t h i s s e c t o r ' s con t r ibu-
t i o n t o GDP has increased from 1% in 1978 t o 2.15% in 
19 87. The average percentage con t r ibu t ion by a g r i c u l t u r e 
t o the GDP over t h e per iod 1978-87 has been mere 1.19%. 
I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o p r e d i c t s h i f t s in sec to ra l 
d i s t r i b u t i o n in UAE. Most l i k e l y o i l s ec to r sha l l cont inue 
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to exercise its dominance in the economy. Construction 
and real estate are likely to decline in importance as the 
real estate boom tapers off. An area which shall perhaps 
occupy an higher position in the coming years is UAEs 
foreign reserves and assets if they are prudently managed 
and properly invested overseas. 
There are certain limitations in way of formula-
ting a coherent development plan for the UAE and then 
strictly abiding by it. 
It is an arduous task to determine the quantum of 
revenues. Proceeds from oil sales constitute the bulk of 
government revenue. The oil prices in the international 
oil market fluctuate and so does the demand for oil keeps 
changing. The demand and price of oil cause a deep impact 
on fiscal and monetary policies. Since this is a frequent 
phenomena so long-range financial commitments are difficult 
to undertake. 
Most of the development projects depend upon 
imported technology, capital goods and raw materials. 
Therefore project costs may vary considerably and so 
costs are difficult to forecast. 
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The federal structure of the country often makes 
it diflicult to coordinate piano, this often re;-,ults in 
duplication of projects and thus causes problems in the 
way of infrastructural development. 
CHAPTER - IV 
INDUSTRIALIZATION IN UAE 
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Industry is estimated to constitute 7.5% to the GDP 
of the economy for the period 1978-87 and ranks sixth in 
the realm of contribution to the GDP for the above mentioned 
period. Existing industry is generally small employing 
limited techniques to cater some requirements of the domestic 
market. In the area of petrochemicals and other downstream 
operations^ sophisticated and highly capital intensive tech-
nology is being used; but it is mainly imported push but en 
technology manned by foreign technicians and technocrats. 
The wealth brought about to the emirates by the sale of oil 
proceeds has induced the process of industrialization due 
to the following reasons: 
1. The rise in incomes and in the purchasing power have 
broadened the market which in turn has fomented the entre-
preneurial talents and industrial awareness. 
2. The oil and prosperity of the region have enticed 
foreign capital and expertise on a large scale. Businessmen 
and representatives of multinational corporations have 
almost necessarily included UAE on their itinaries. 
The Government has sponsored and undertaken a large 
number of extensive surveys to ascertain the country's 
potential and its resources in order to lay down its 
industrial policy on firm and scientific foundations. 
100 
In 19 68, Arthur D. Little Inc was engaged for the 
first time to carry on an industrial survey, which submitted 
it's report in 1970. The Ministry of Oil and Industry utili-
sed the findings of the survey to draft industrial plans . 
Since then many other surveys have been undertaken. 
The First Five Year Plan (1968-72) allocated 20% of 
its budget to industry. This included water and power 
projects. Excluding the power and water projects the 
effective percentage allocation to industry comes to be 
only 5.8%. This low percentage was due to the reason that 
bulk of the funds were allocated to surveys and studies 
undertaken. In 1972 15% of the annual budget allocation was 
2 
made t o indus t ry . 
The s a l i e n t f ea tu r e s of the i n d u s t r i a l po l icy of UAE 
3 
may be svimmarised as follows : 
I n d u s t r i e s l i k e o i l r e f i n e r i e s and cement f a c t o r i e s 
r equ i r ing domest ica l ly a v a i l a b l e raw m a t e r i a l s are t o be 
financed by government and assigned top p r i o r i t y . 
1. L i t t l e , A.D,, " I n d u s t r i a l Development Oppor tun i t i es for 
Abu Dhabi", Cambridge, 1970. ' 
2. El Mallakh, R.; "The ii^conomic Development of the L'nited 
Arab Emira tes" , Groom Heln, London (U.K.) , p . 46, 19tsi. 
3 . "Xndustry and P lans of I n d u s t r i a l Development in U/vE" ; 
M i n i s t r y of Finance, UAE"; Tnird Arab i n d u s t r i a l Ueve1op -
ment Conference, T r i p o l i (Libya) , pp . 13-14, Apr i l , 1974 
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Participation by the private sector in industrial 
development is to be encouraged by providing them with 
various incentives and concessions. 
The factories set up with the aim of promoting their 
products in the foreign market segment are to be established 
only with foreign participation so as to secure efficient 
international distribution channels. 
Crude petroleum and natural gas based industries 
are to be fostered. 
The Arthur D, Little report referred to earlier has 
made the following two fold classification of industries 
which often overlap with each other: 
i) those of immediate value 
ii) those that depend on future economic policies. 
Under the first classification the areas identified 
are: manufacture of sulphur and cement, setting up of 
repair and mechanical workshops, printing and stationery, 
all of which are considered important in meeting domestic 
needs and viable on economic grounds. 
The second type of industry has been further sub-
divided into two categories: 
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i) Short run projects - cement man-afacturing, oil refinino, 
tyre recapping, dry cleaning units and bakery units. 
ii) Long run projects - ice and refrigeration, warehouses, 
lubricant oils recycling, flour mills and ammonia 
plants. 
The Second Five Year Plan (in fact the first plan of 
4 
independent UAE) was drawn up for the period 1981-85 . By 
19 79 most of the infrastructural projects had been netted 
down viz roads, communications, and social services facili-
ties were completed. Consequently the Ministry of Planning 
prepared a five year plan for the early eighties focusing 
on economic and social projects which would increase the 
cohesiveness of the federation. The plan anticipated 
federal expenditure on projects totalling Dh 16 billion 
($ 4.36 billion) over the five year period, with a consi-
detrable additional amount to come from the private sector. 
The plan was drastically revised in 1982 in the light of 
declining oil revenues. At that point it became clear that 
the plan would serve as no more than a series of guidelines, 
with most of the meaningful fiscal allocations being 
5 
decided on a year to year basis . The plan was drafted on 
the assumption that oil revenues would remain constant and 
4. Anthony, Mc D.; Financial Times, p. 3, June 23, 19 80. 
5. MERI Report - UAE; Univ. Pennsylvania, Croom Helm, 
London CU.K.), p. 71, 19 85. 
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t h a t 70% of investment under the plan would come from the 
UAE government. When the o i l market cont rac ted / the notion 
of planning a lso criombled dov;n . This c h i l l i n g economic 
s i t u a t i o n had i t s impact on t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and 
manufacturing process and hinderd i t s pace . Although the 
pace was slowed down but p rog res s in i n d u s t r i e s has been 
made. 
In the mid seven t i e s an i n d u s t r i a l area was designa-
t ed at Mussafah in Abu Ohabi and the opera t ions included 
mainly workshops, se rv ice and maintenance c e n t r e s . I t a l so 
included small and l i g h t i n d u s t r y . Fur ther another i n d u s t r i a l 
e s t a t e was se t up at Mafraw a longside t h e Tar i f road. The 
major l i m i t i n g f ac to r t o the l i g h t i n d u s t r i e s growth in 
t h e emira tes i s the s ize of the domestic market . The t o t a l 
popula t ion of UAE i s 1,622,464 and Abu Dhabi ' s only 570,125. 
An area wise and popula t ion wise break up of d i f f e r en t s t a t e s 
i s given in t h e t a b l e 4 . 1 . 
The l i m i t e d s i ze of t he domestic market tends t o 
cramp product ion causing disadvantage t o t he l oca l companies 
v i sa v i s t h e i r foreign c o m p e t i t o r ' s . I n s p i t e of t h e var ious 
c o n s t r a i n t s t h e r e have been a nximber of successful v e n t u r e s . 
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and C I toh of Japan 
6. Economic I n t e l l i g e n c e Uni t , Country P r o f i l e - UAE; 
p . 11, 19 88-89. 
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Table 4 ,1 
Area and Popula t ion of the Seven Emirates 
Emirates Area Populat ion 
(Sa.km.) 
Abu Dhabi 
Qxibai 
Sharj ah 
Ras-al-Khaimah 
Fuja i rah 
Umm-al-Qaiwain 
Ajman 
T o t a l 7 7 , 7 0 0 1 , 6 2 2 , 4 6 4 
S o u r c e ; Compi led from UAE C e n s u s 1985/ M i n i s t r y of 
P l a n n i n g . 
6 7 , 3 5 0 
3 , 9 0 0 
2 , 6 0 0 
1 ,700 
1,150 
750 
25 0 
6 7 0 , 1 2 5 
4 1 9 , 1 0 4 
2 6 8 , 7 2 3 
1 1 6 , 4 7 0 
5 4 , 4 2 5 
2 9 , 2 9 9 
6 4 , 3 1 8 
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have jointly promoted Abu Dhabi National Plastic Pipe Fabri-
cation Company (NPPFC), which manufactures pipes for irri-
gation, water supply and sewerage. l\iPPFC has sold its 
product competitively in the local market. Its pipes have 
been extensively used on many ADNOC jobs. After having 
exerted its sizeable influence in the local market/ the 
company has expanded its manufacturing capacity and exported 
pipes to many other Gulf countries. NPPFC has followed the 
classic pattern for successful industry in the Gulf i.e. 
capital intensive techniques. It has used foreign technical 
expertise, expensive machinery and minimum of labour. In 
UAE labour costs are high because accomodation, air fares 
and other paraphernalia has to be provided, particularly 
Abu Dhabi is estimated to be the most expensive of all the 
emirates. 
The governments engine for non-oil industrial deve-
lopment is the General Industries Corporation (GIC) estab-
lished in June 1979 to formulate industrial plans and to 
manage factories on government•'s behalf. GIC also partici-
pates in private sector development by committing to 
feasibility studies and commissioning consultants. "It is 
also responsible for issuing licences, and in theory does 
not give them to duplicated projects. In practice this is 
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not n e c e s s a r i l y so because dec i s ions are not always based 
on cold bus iness f a c t s . Repeated c a l l s by chambers of 
commerce, inc luding the UAE Federat ion of Chambers of 
Commerce and Indus t ry , have so fa r f a i l e d t o produce a 
7 
na t iona l po l i cy" . GIC philosophy on non-hydrocarbons based 
indus t ry l eans towards import s u b s t i t u t i o n . A sec t ion of 
bus iness a n a l y s t s feel t h a t the government should not 
involve i t s e l f in l i g h t i n d u s t r y . Thei r view i s t h a t the 
QIC's ro le should be t o look at t he f e a s i b i l i t y of proposals 
and help with planning and finance but leave p r i v a t e 
concerns t o do t h e ac tua l running of a p l a n t . 
A survey undertaken by the Minis t ry of Finance and 
Indus t ry in 1987 has found t h a t t o t a l number of i n d u s t r i a l 
p l a n t s t h a t e x i s t e d were 504. Tota l investment in them was 
t o the tune of $ 2.7 bn and t h e i r combined output was of 
the value of $ 1.77 bn. A major p l an t of aluminium ca l led 
Dubai Aluminium Smelter p l a n t (DUBAL) was opened in 1979 
at a cost of $ 800 mi l l ion with an o r i g i n a l capaci ty of 
135,000 t o n n e s . Since then i t s product ion has increased and 
in 1986 i t exported 150,000 tonnes of high q u a l i t y aluminium 
ingo t s valued at $ 150 m i l l i o n and i t i s opera t ing a t i t s 
100% capac i t y . The success of DUBAL and a r i s e in the p r i c e 
of premium q u a l i t y aluminixam has induced Umm-al-Qaiwain t o 
7. MEED,Special Report, p . 37, 19 80. 
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cons t ruc t a $ 1.1 bn aluminium p lan t with a capaci ty of 
240,000 t o n n e s . A notable f e r t i l i z e r company ca l l ed Abu 
Dhabi National F e r t i l i z e r s Company ( F e r t i l ) commenced i t s 
product ion in 1984 with 1,000 tonnes of ammonia and 1,500 
tonnes of u r ea . I t s annual product ion in 1987 was 275,000 
tonnes of ammonia and 343,000 tonnes of u r e a . Emirates 
I n d u s t r i a l Development Bank set up in 1982 t o encourage 
the p r i v a t e s ec to r t o upgrade i t s ro l e in the economy had 
disbursed more than $ 44 m i l l i o n in 32 loans upto 1987 t o 
an i nc rea s ing ly v e r s a t i l e UAE p r i v a t e s e c t o r , which i s 
c a t e r ing t o t h e c o u n t r y ' s i nc reas ing demand in t e x t i l e s , 
f u r n i t u r e , foods tuf fs and p l a s t i c goods. However^there 
seem t o be many a lacuna in t h e l i c ens ing po l i cy of t h e 
country. A UAE Chamber of Commerce report suggested t h a t 
t h e r e was an 'absence of coo rd ina t ion ' and a lack of 
' c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y ' t o i s sue i n d u s t r i a l l i c e n c e s with the 
r e s u l t t h a t as many as 90 f a c t o r i e s in UAE were producing 
alxominium goods, 5 cement f a c t o r i e s in neighbouring 
emira tes causing an excess of supply over demand and 
Q 
17 plants manufacturing plastic.- products . The United 
Arab Emirates is making serious efforts to diversify its 
economy and lessen its dependence on revenue proceeds of 
S. Abeidoh Rowhi, OPEC Bulletin, XVIII(9), 21-25, 1987. 
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hydrocarbons. As mentioned e a r l i e r in i n t roduc t i on and as 
can be gauged from Table 1.4/ petroleum expor t s cont r ibuted 
89.55% to the t o t a l expor ts for the per iod 1970-80 and 
79.71% for t he pe r iod 1981-87. This impl ies t h a t non-oi l 
expor ts have increased by 10% approximately, though the 
petroleum exported in absolu te terms has i n c r e a s e d . Thus 
t he con t r ibu t ion of non - o i l expor t s t o t o t a l expor ts for 
the per iod 19 81-87 i s 20% approximately . This suggests t h a t 
the o i l revenues have helped in d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of the 
economy and s t rengthening of t h e manufacturing s e c t o r . 
Although t h e country has mainly developed l i g h t and 
medium i n d u s t r i e s and i t can hope t o compete bes t in t h i s 
area at[ainst tough i n t e r n a t i o n a l competit ion yet i t has 
set up c e r t a i n heavy i n d u s t r i e s harping upon i t s l oca t iona l 
advantage. UAE i s loca ted in the cen t re of wor ld ' s most 
copious o i l producing reg ion . This has encouraged sh ip -
r e p a i r i n g and r i g - f a b r i c a t i o n yards along with an array 
of se rv ice i n d u s t r i e s connected v;ith both upstream and 
downstream o p e r a t i o n s . Another s i g n i f i c a n t economic fac tor 
i s t he supply of cheap energy p a r t i c u l a r l y n a t u r a l ga s . 
Cheap e l e c t r i c i t y i s generated with n a t u r a l gas pov;ered 
t u r b i n e s . Natural gas has been a l so used in aluminium 
smelting and f e r t i l i z e r companies. In f e r t i l i z e r product ion, 
na tu ra l gas i s used not only as a cheap source of energy 
but a l so as a raw m a t e r i a l . 
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Following are some of the reflections to limitations 
and amplifications to industries in the Gulf. 
"Arab planners are aware of the issues involved in 
developing modern industry under conditions prevailing on 
the international market on the one hand, and in the 
regionally co-ordinated self-centred national economies 
in the area on the other. In February 1976, the Arabian 
Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consulting (AGOIC) was 
set up, with the support of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, 
Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and Iraq (with residence in Doha, 
Qatar), to streamline national plans and to avoid duplica-
tion of industrial projects through regional planning and 
co-ordination, feasibility studies and technological co-
operation . 
Not all industries require large scale enterprises 
and their efficiency mainly depends on other factors, such 
as skill, management and other factor endowments leading 
to comparative advantage. However, certain other industries, 
which are found to be central to Arab industrial strategies, 
such as steel, chemicals and petrochemicals, refineries, 
engineering industry and even modern textile plants are 
dependent on a pool of technological and financial resources 
and the economies of scale achieved through more integrated 
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production and marketing" . 
"Regulations of the interest rate structure in the 
UAL ior example has an important bearing on the level of 
deposits and lending and therefore on general economic 
activity. In certain Arab countries the progression in 
income tax rates is steep, e.g. Egypt, In others it is 
moderate (e.g. Lebanon), And in still others there are 
virtually no income taxes at all (e.g. the Gulf countries)"" . 
The above mentioned views suggest that regional 
co-ordination and integration is required in industrial 
policies. A prudent mix of factors of production is also 
warranted with a view to achieve comparative advantage. 
The absence of income tax is not an incentive in fact. 
Whenever there is taxation then there are also tax benefits 
linked to productivity. So taxation indirectly provides 
motivation and thus encourages productivity and economic 
measures leading to optimum production. 
Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority; 
Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority (JAFZA) was set up in 
1979 with a $ 2,500 million complex. But the authority 
9. Z.Y. Harshlag, "Industrialisation in Arab Countries: 
Patterns, Options and Strategies", in Roberto Aliboni 
(ed.), Arab Industrialization and Economic Integration, 
Croom Helm,London (L.K.), pp. 7 2-73, 19 79. 
10. Samir A. Makdisi,"Arab Economic Co-operation", in Roberto 
Aliboni (ed,), Arab Industrialization and Economic 
Integration, Croom Holm, London (U.K.), pp. 112-113, 19 79 
I l l 
gained meagre bus iness due t o t he h o s t i l e economic environ-
ment on account of I ran - I r aq \var, JAFZA has acquired 
add i t i ona l 55 square k i lometers of land in Apri l 1988. This 
s i gna l s enthusiasm on pa r t of JAFZA t o continue expansion 
desp i t e t he va r ious odds faced by i t . In 1988 i t fared we l l . 
In October t h e sam.e year t he a u t h o r i t y signed one of i t s 
l a r g e s t d e a l s , v/hich took more than a year t o set up . 
Emirates Narmada I n d u s t r i e s (ENI) agreed t o l ea se 254,000 
square metres of land for 25 years t o b u i l d a phosphoric 
ac id p lan t for an es t imated $ 85 m i l l i o n , ENI i s a j o i n t 
venture of I n d i a ' s Gujarat Narmada Valley F e r t i l i z e r 
Company and Abu Dhabi based Mozak I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Another ambit ious p r o j e c t i s a l so an Indian - led 
j o i n t venture led by Bombay based Reliance I n d u s t r i e s . The 
firm i s p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r f inancing p lans for a $ 900 mi l l ion 
r e f i ne ry for Jebe l A l l . I t wants t o inves t about $ 120 
mi l l ion in t he r e f ine ry with a fu r the r $ 80 mi l l ion coming 
from Gulf based I n d i a n s , and the r e s t from banks and 
f inance houses . The Abu Dhabi Investment Author i ty , the 
emira tes investment arm, i s i n t e r e s t e d in t ak ing p a r t . 
Reliance says . The company i s due t o p resen t f inancing 
12 p lans t o Economy and Trade o f f i c i a l s soon 
1 1 . MEED, X X X I I ( 4 2 ) , 3 5 , 1 9 8 8 . 
1 2 . MEED, S p e c i a l R e p o r t , p . 1 9 , 19 8 9 . 
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Apart from the large capital intensive firms such as 
Dubai Aluminium (DUBAL) and Dubai Natural Gas Company 
(DUGAS) small scale manufacturing and trading has registered 
sizeable progress in recent years. More than 30 textile 
manufacturing units exist in the free zone. The USA has 
become increasingly concerned about the boom in UAE textile 
exports in recent years. So the two sides agreed a visa 
arrangement to regulate textile sales and ensure they were 
of UAE origin-'-"^ . 
The zone was opened to offshore insurance firms, 
trading companies and banks by a government decree in 1986. 
In 1988, the United Arab Bank opened a branch in the zone. 
Besides offering usual services, the bank arranges letters 
of credit for free zone firms. There is a high waiting list 
of companies to enter the free zone to set up manufacturing 
units. 
Several other large projects have been completed in 
the zone. The British Petroleum Company brought its Dh 37 
million lubricants plant on stream in 1988. The plant has 
an annual capacity of 30,000 tonnes and can manufacture 
14 
about 75 types of lubricants 
1 3 . MEED, X X X I I ( 1 4 ) , 5 4 , 1 9 8 8 . 
1 4 . MEED, S p e c i a l R e p o r t , p . 1 9 , 1 9 8 8 . 
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Optimism is high at the free zone with the Gulf v;ar 
ceasefire of August 1988. The end of the war has emboldened 
larger international companies to set up in Jebel Ali Free 
Zone. So long the war continued, larger companies consi-
dered the entire region to be a security risk. They were not 
willing to make large investments or keep large stocks of 
equipments in the area then. But it is difficult to predict 
whether this optimism is going to last long. Already the 
investment environment has become clumsy due to the fresh 
Gulf crisis imposed by the aggression of Iraq over Kuwait 
and presence of allied troops in the region. 
More than 240 firms were operating in the zone by 
mid - 1989. The total capital invested was more than 
$ 600 million with a forecast to rise to $ l/OOO million, 
by the end of 1989. Many Japanese companies have been 
coming forward to set up in the Jebel Ali with distribution 
being a key selling point in the Gulf. 
Dubai Natural Gas Company's (DUGAS) pipeline from 
the Margham field to the company's Jebel Ali processing 
plant started up in April 19 89, with a maximum capacity of 
13,5 million cubic feet a day. It will boost the company's 
plans to increase its customer base at Jebel Ali, although 
most of the surplus gas is still tied up in long- term 
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15 domestic and overseas c o n t r a c t s 
Other developments are under way t o make the zone a 
more comprehensive base for bus iness including a new banking 
c e n t r e . Jebe l A l i ' s i n d u s t r i a l development p l ans s t i l l have 
a long way t o go. The Gulf war cea se f i r e has brought credence 
t o the area but t he p resen t v o l a t i l e s i t u a t i o n in the Gulf 
has again given a setback t o i t . 
The major i n d u s t r i e s in terms of con t r i bu t ion t o 
i n d u s t r i a l output are e i t h e r petrochemical ( e . g . petroleum 
re f in ing or f e r t i l i z e r product ion) or l inked t o cons t ruc t ion 
(aluminium or cement) . Although the development of such 
i n d u s t r i e s has recorded a s i g n i f i c a n t success but these do 
not r e f l e c t adequate d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . Hydrocarbon i n d u s t r i e s 
are too c lose ly a s soc ia t ed t o the dominant petroleum sec to r , 
so t h e i r f e t e would be p e r i l o u s in t he event of any 
s luggishness or dep le t ion of o i l r e s e r v e s . Where as 
i n d u s t r i e s l i k e cement o r alviminiiara are c l o s e l y l inked t o 
cons t ruc t i on , a heavy c y c l i c a l indus t ry t h a t i s very depen-
dent on the l e v e l of economic a c t i v i t y . 
L imi ta t ions t o I n d u s t r y ; 
There e x i s t se r ious reg iona l d i s p a r i t i e s in the geo-
graphic d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n d u s t r i e s . The major i n d u s t r i a l 
15. MEED, Special Report, pp . 19-20, 19 89. 
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centres are in Ruwais in Abu Dhabi and Jebel Ali in Dubai -
the emirates which have the greatest oil wealth are the 
ones most successful in industrial production. 
The Ruwais industrial complex is approximately 150 
kilometers to the east of Abu Dhabi city and Jebel Ali 
industrial zone is immediately to the south of Dubai city. 
There exist industries in other emirates but the concentra-
tion of industries is heavily skewed towards Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai . 
There is lack of coordination between planners in 
different sheikhdoms, so identical projects like cement 
industry often compete with each other. 
The labour costs are very high as industry depends 
upon expatriate labour due to low level of skills in the 
national labour force. 
Most industries in the private sector are controlled 
by large business families like Galadari and Futtaim. This 
has its own subtle impact on rational industrial planning. 
This creates a likelihood of mismanagement and inappropriate 
financing practices. 
Most of the industries are gas based and therefore 
any changes in oil prices have a direct impact on non-oil 
industries. 
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Many projects are dependent on imported raw materialG. 
Few, like the steel and paper bag factory in Sharjah, had 
to be closed due to difficulties in obtaining the required 
raw materials. 
Numerous industries are dependent on construction. 
Any slowdown in construction activity is likely to have an 
adverse impact on the industrial sector. The cement industry 
in particular has suffered considerably. The National 
Cement Company (NCC) a privately owned company in Dubai had 
to cut down its price by 50% in 19 82. 
Better marketing and distribution techniques are 
required for its manufactured products especially in view 
of the limited population of UAE. 
The involvement of government in the manufacture of 
small scale items causes a parallex in the government 
focus. This distracts the government attention to trivial 
affairs. 
CHAPTER - V 
FOREIGN TRADE IN UAE 
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The UAZ expor ts rose r a p i d l y in t h e seven t i e s reach-
ing t h e h ighes t po in t in 1980 i . e . US $ 21,967 mi l l ion 
(see 6ble 1,4 in chapter 1 ) . This mir rored t h e b r i s k 
r i s e in o i l p r i c e s UAEs main expor t . The p r i c e of UAE 
crude increased by 138% from 1979 t o 1980 (see t a b l e 3.5 
in chapter 3 ) . The o i l p r i c e s f u r t he r rose in 1981 by 
6.3% and dec l ined marginal ly in 1982 by 3.1% and cons i -
derably dec l ined in 1983 by 14,4%. The volume of crude 
o i l expor t s decreased as t he p r i c e r o s e . 
The f a l l in o i l p r i c e s in 1982 caused a low produc-
t i o n in o i l ou tpu t , t h e r e f o r e lower quantum of o i l 
expor ts and t h e r e f o r e l e s s e r o i l export revenues . The 
o i l product ion decl ined by 16.9% in 1982, 8% in 19 83, 
7% in 1984, 1.1% in 1985 and 23.9% in 1986. (see t a b l e 2.1 
in chapter 2 ) . Consequently t h e o i l export revenues 
decl ined by 18.4% in 1982, 20.2% in 1983, 9% in 19 85 and 
and 36.3% in 1986. By 1982 o i l expor ts c o n s t i t u t e d 84.2% 
of t he t o t a l expor t s which continued t o dec l ine upto 
74.1% in 1986. 
Exports o t h e r than Oil C o n s t i t u t e ; 
i) Products of n a t u r a l gas l i q u i d s and l i q u i f i e d na tu ra l 
gas . 
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ii> Re-exports l a r g e l y cnannel led through Dubai which has 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y been a cen t re of en t repo t t r a d e . Of f ic ia l 
s t a t i s t i c s on the re -expor t are known t o be u n r e l i a b l e , 
because much of t he t r a d e i s in t he form of unrecorded 
contraband. S t i l l s t a t i s t i c s se2rve as an i n d i c a t o r of 
the o v e r a l l trend:. In 1982 adjusted r e - e x p o r t s were 
es t imated t o have dec l ined from 18% of t o t a l imports 
t o 15.5%. This displayed t h e s tagnant demand caused 
by t h e I r an - I r aq war. I r a n , which used t o be a major 
d e s t i n a t i o n for TJAE expor t s had a share of UAE exports 
es t imated a t a mere 5.9% of t he t o t a l compared t o 
28.3% before t he war began. The major d e s t i n a t i o n 
a f t e r the outbreak of I r a n - I r a q war was Saudi Arabia 
with 23.3% of t o t a l r e - e x p o r t s followed by Japan 12.5% 
and Qatar 11.3% . These r e - e x p o r t s p r i m a r i l y c o n s t i t u t e d 
57.7% of consumer goods and 35.4% of t h e c a p i t a l goods 
of t h e t o t a l in 1982 (see t a b l e 5 . 1 ) . In 1987 Dubai ' s re-
- expor t s t o I r an rose by 76%, from Dh 738 mi l l i on in 
1986 t o Dh 1,305 mn - 25% of t he t o t a l - but the t r ade 
i s always vu lnerab le t o d u t i e s charged a t the I r an ian 
end^. 
1 . MERI R e p o r t - UAE; Univ P e n n s y l v a n i a , Croom Helm, 
London ( U - K - ) , p p . 1 0 7 - 1 0 8 , 1 9 8 5 . 
2. Economic I n t e l l i g e n r e Uni t , Country Prnfilf» - UAF.-
p . 38, 1988-89. 
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I t e m s 
T a b l e 5 . 1 
S t r u c t u r e of Recorded R e - e x p o r t s (19 81-19 83) 
( M i l l i o n Dh) 
1981 1982 1983 
Amount % Amount % Amount % 
Consumer goods 2 , 3 6 4 . 8 62.U 1,966.0 57 .7 2 ,205 .9 67.4 
Foods tuf f & 
t o b a c c o 816.7 21.4 522,3 15 .3 339.0 10,4 
I n t e r m e d i a r y goods 274.6 7 .2 214.9 6.3 171.1 5 .2 
C a p i t a l goods 1 ,131.8 29 .7 1 ,206.2 35.4 791.7 24.2 
Other 43 .2 1.1 18 .1 0 .5 104.8 3.2 
T o t a l 3 ,814 .4 100 3 ,405 .2 100 3 ,273 .5 100 
Source : MERI R e p o r t , - UAE; Un iv . P e n n s y l v a n i a , Croom Helm, 
London t U , K . j , p . 181 , 1985. 
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T a b l e 5 .2 
I m p o r t s by Kialor C a t e g o r i e s (1981-1982) 
I t e m s Amount ( B i l l i o n Dh) 
1981 1982 
Annual Rate of Chanoe 
(%) 
1981 1982 
Consumer goods 16.0 15.7 + 8 . 1 - 1 . 9 
Foodstuff & 
tobacco 4 . 2 3 . 8 +5.0 - 9 . 5 
Intermediary 
goods 6 . 9 4 . 9 + 19.0 - 2 9 . 0 
Capita l goods 12 .2 13.6 + 5 . 2 + 11.5 
O the r 0 . 3 0 .4 + 5 0 . 0 + 3 3 . 3 
T o t a l 3 5 . 4 3 4 . 6 + 2 2 . 3 •2.3 
Source : o p . c i t . , p . 120. 
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Table 5.4 
Average Perdentaqe Direction of Crude Oil Exports 
(1978-1987) 
Countr ies % Di rec t ion Ranks 
Japan 44.58 l 
France 9.45 2 
United S ta t e s 7.55 3 
Netherlands 4.01 4 
I t a l y 3.49 5 
W. Germans 2.95 6 
United Kingdom 2.37 7 
Other 26.61 
Source: Computed on the b a s i s of computations made 
in Table 5 . 3 . 
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The d i r e c t i o n of crude o i l expor t s from t h e year 
1978 r e f l e c t s d i f f e r e n t p a t t e r n s of demand and a l so 
s h i f t s due t o product ion cu tbacks . Japan has had the 
l a r g e s t crude o i l expor ts from UAE. Crude o i l exported 
t o Japan rose s izeab ly from 26.5% in 1978 t o 37.3% in 
1980 i . e . an inc rease of 10.8%. I t dec l ined marginal ly 
in 1982 and again rose in 1983 and 1984. I t reached an 
a l l time high of 68.2% in 19 85 but declined t o 49% in 
1987. F rance ' s share f l u c t u a t e d s l i g h t l y upto 1983 and 
then decreased s teadi ly upto 1986. Exports t o USA have 
decreased almost continuously except for the years 1982, 
1984 and 1987, The average percentage d i r e c t i o n of crude 
o i l expor ts for t h e decade 1978-87 has been heavi ly 
skewed in favour of Japan with 44.58% for t h e p e r i o d . 
The UAE's l imi t ed non-o i l product ion c a p a b i l i t i e s 
have made t h e economy heav i ly dependent on imports for 
both consumption and inves tment . From 1978 t o 1981 the 
imports r e g i s t e r e d an i n c r e a s i n g t rend peaking t o 
Dh 40784 mi l l i on in 1981 and then cont inuously dec l ined . 
The reason for such a t r e n d has been t h a t t he o i l p r i c e s 
rose s t e a d i l y from 1978 t o 1981 and so economic a c t i v i t y 
s t imula ted with t he growth in government expend i tu re . 
From 1982 upto 1986 with t h e ensuing o i l g lu t and dec l in ing 
o i l p r i c e s / t h e imports dec l ined due t o reduced government 
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spending. The recess ion which followed led t o a reduc-
t i o n in import demand by both p r i v a t e and p u b l i c s e c t o r s . 
The value of imports stood a t Dh 31850 mi l l i on compared 
t o Dh 40784 mi l l i on in 1981. The expor t s have a l so been 
high whenever the imports have been h igh . This again 
p o i n t s t o t h e importance of o i l revenues in t h e context 
of UAE economy. The major source of revenue t o t h e 
economy of UAE i s t he proceeds from t h e sa le of o i l and 
so t h i s has a d i r e c t bea r ing on t h e front of foreign t r a d e 
as w e l l . The surp lus balance of payment has a l so been 
higher whenever t h e o i l p r i c e s in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
market have been h igh . 
The major i tems of import are manufactured goods, 
machinery and t r a n s p o r t equipment for both consumer and 
product ive u s e s . They accounted for 70% of t o t a l imports 
during 19 80-82/ some what lower than t h e average of 75% 
during the mid - s even t i e s p a r t l y because some degree 
of s a t u r a t i o n has been reached. 
Japan remains t h e major supp l i e r of impor ts , 
p r imar i ly manufactured goods and machinery, accounting 
for 15.5% of the t o t a l imports in 1987. The United Kingdom 
was second accounting for 10.9%. Germany and United Sta tes 
followed with 10.2% and 8.6% r e s p e c t i v e l y . Imports from 
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France and Italy accounted for 5.8% and 5.2% respectively. 
The quantum of imports from India in 1987 was 3.5% and 
that from Netherlands 2.2%. Main suppliers of imports 
are also incidentally the main purchasers of oil. 
Aid; 
Aid disbursements by the UAE consist of foreign 
grants (which as official transfers^ are properly part 
of the current account balance) and foreign loans (which 
as exports of capital are part of the capital account 
balance) . 
The UAE has traditionally been a generous donor 
of aid. The reasons for UAE being an active donor of aid 
are possibly due to the reasons that; UAE is largely 
dependent on expatriate labour and foreign imports and 
therefore must cultivate ties with other LDCs; tradi-
tional ties of UAE with Arab and Muslim states oblige it 
to provide them with some assistance and finally political 
tensions in the Gulf region and the relative defenceless-
ness of the UAE make the cultivation of close ties 
imperative. 
Grants offered by the UAE government have been 
high as a percentage of both GDP and oil export revenues. 
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During the mid seventies (1972-77) official grants to 
developing countries were approximately 9% of oil export 
receipts. The percentage fell in 1978 and rose sharply 
in 19 79-80 at which point it again stood at 9% of total 
3 
oil receipts or 6% of GDP . Official loans and grants 
totalled over Dh 9.6 bn in 1981 but by 1985 had fallen to 
Dh 1.9 bn. Pressure remains on the UAE as a major oil 
exporter to sustain its aid performance both at the pan-
Arab and international level, although individual rulers 
4 
make donations to humanitarian causes on a personal basis . 
Concessionary loans to developing states have 
been disbursed bilaterally by Abu Dhabi to Arab and 
Islamic countries, and indirectly through multilateral 
aid organisations, like the Arab Monetary Fund, the 
Islamic Development Bank, the OPEC Fund and the Arab 
Bank for the Economic Development of Africa. In 1981, 
concessionary loans began to be substituted for grants, 
so that official loans disbursed by Abu Dhabi increased 
dramatically from Dh 1.3 billion in 1980 to Dh 5.4 billion 
in 1981. They declined however, to Dh 3.2 billion in 
1982, reflecting increasing fiscal conservatism by the 
3. MERI Report - UAE; Univ. Pennsylvania,, Groom Helm, 
London (U.K*), p. Ill, 1985 
4. Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Profile - UAE; 
p. 41, 19 88-89. 
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Abu Dhabi a u t h o r i t i e s . 
Of f i c i a l loans a re a l so d isbursed through lending 
and equi ty p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the Federal Government. The 
major o f f i c i a l donor agency i s Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab 
Economic Development (ADFAED) set up in 1971 and d e s p i t e 
i t s t i t l e may lend t o a l l developing c o u n t r i e s , Arab and 
non-Arab. The downturn in Abu Dhabi ' s o i l revenues s ince 
t he s t a r t of the 1980s caused a no t i ceab l e l u l l in ADFAED's 
a c t i v i t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in 1983 when only two loans were 
made, but as upto December 1986 t h e fund had made 88 
loans t o 42 c o u n t r i e s , v7orth a t o t a l of Dh, 4,026 m i l l i o n . 
There i s a lso an a d d i t i o n a l Dh 2,558 m i l l i o n of loans and 
g r a n t s made by t h e Abu Dhabi government ( e f f e c t i v e l y 
the ru l ing family) which ADFAED a d m i n i s t e r s . Some 5 2% 
of money disbursed from t h i s source has gone i n t o loans 
by t h e fund, 23.5% i n t o government l oans , 10.7% i n t o 
l oca l p r o j e c t s , 10.3% i n t o government g r a n t s and equi ty 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n and 3.5% i n t o t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e . Some 
75% of ADFAED loans have been t o Arab c o u n t r i e s . In 
1988 the fund extended a loan of $ 75 mi l l ion t o Egypt 
for land rec lamat ion . The fund ' s o r i g i n a l au thor i sed 
c a p i t a l of Dh 2 B i l l i o n has been rep len i shed from t ime 
t o t ime by the Abu Dhabi government; i t s committed c a p i t a l 
5 . MERI Report, op . c i t . , p . 129. 
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now totals around Dh 8 billion . 
Oil exports have declined sharply in value. Non-
oil exports have increased somewhat. Imports have begun 
to decline possibly due to lessened purchasing power. 
Given the cuts in economic aid to other countries and 
the expected decline in remittances sent by foreign 
workers abroad, the current account surplus is expected 
to improve. 
6. Economic,Intelligence Unit, op. cit., p. 129. 
CONCLUSION 
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The study brings to picture the importance of oil 
in the context of the economy of UAE, The role that it 
has played in the economic development of the country. 
The advance and modern economic structure that exists today 
is in stark contrast to the simple and primitive economy 
of the country that existed before the discovery of oil. 
The orbit of the UAE economy was strictly circumscribed 
to catering to some of the simple needs of that period. 
The study further observes that the oil revenues 
have led to the emergence of various industiries. It has 
been illustrated that oil sector is the leading sector 
and therefore any changes in the oil prices and revenues 
have their impact on other productive sectors of the 
economy. Moreover oil receipts continue to be a major 
source of income. Therefore it is but imperative to 
invest the oil revenues with a view to diversify the 
economy so that it does not depend too much on a single 
source of income. 
The economy of the United Arab Emirates is no longer 
an isolated economy but necessarily an interlinked and 
internationally unified and multilateral economy because 
of the strategic and important position that oil enjoys. 
So the UAE needs to monitor very vigorously the inter-
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national events and trends and keep a very warm in te res t 
in OPEC and i t s economic re la t ions with other countr ies . 
Gulf possesses 63.2% of crude o i l reserves out of 
the t o t a l world o i l reserves and 69,3% excluding the 
cent ra l ly planned economies. Similarly OPEC possesses 
75.8% of the t o t a l world and 83.2% of the world excluding 
the cent ra l ly planned economics. The posi t ion of crude 
o i l reserves with UAE i s 11% of the t o t a l world, 12% 
(approximately) of the world excluding cent ra l ly planned 
economics, 17.4% of the Gulf and 14.5% of the OPEC. This 
data shows tha t UAE possesses one of the largest reserves 
of o i l in the world. Moreover UAE i s one of the largest 
producer and exporter of crude o i l in the world. 
I t has been observed in the previous chapters that 
an increase in in te rna t iona l pr ice of o i l r e su l t s in 
an increase in o i l revenues. The increased o i l revenues 
resu l t in the sectoral growth of tihe economy a nd increase 
the propensity t o import as the standard of l iv ing in the 
country increases with the flow of money. Direction of 
t rade has also been considerably affected by the exports 
of o i l . The countries which are the la rges t importers of 
o i l from UAE happen t o be the main suppliers of various 
commodities t o UAE. 
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From the study the following conclusions emerge: 
Firstly* UAE has a large amount of monetary reserves 
which have been earned over the period from oil receipts. 
It is a capital surplus country so it should harp upon 
its present resources and strive at astute monetary mana-
gement and investment of its funds in the international 
market specially the third world countries. Third world 
economies are usually capital deficient economies and 
possess a congenial investment climate. UAE can enter 
into equity participation in joint ventures with countries 
frcxn the third world. 
Secondly, UAE does not possess an organised capital 
market and money market. This is a serious shortcoming, 
specially in the context of UAE, Due to the absence of 
capital market large amounts of investible funds remain 
as idle money or find their way in the international banks, 
which is not a very sound economic proposition. Moreover 
the absence of the capital market and money market restricts 
the growth of Joint stock companies and checks the process 
of economic development and industrialization. The present 
industrial financing system is not organically linked to 
the ultimate sources of savings. It will be desirable to 
forge links between the distributing mechanism on the one 
hand and the normal channels of saving on the other so 
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that the distributing mechanism becomes increasingly capable 
of growing autonomously with the needs of the economy on 
the basis of available savings. 
A certain percentage of its oil revenues may be kept 
aside in the country's reserve to fall back upon in cases 
of economic hardships such as war, recession, oil glut in 
the international market, declining oil price etc. as 
Kuwait keeps 10% of its national income in the- 'Reserve Fund' 
for Future Generation'(RPFG)• 
Since oil is a wasting resource so it must be used 
prudently. 
The oil industry should enter into more of down-
stream and petrochemical operations. Excessive oil produc-
tion should be avoided so as to prolong the lives of oil 
fields. 
Thirdly/ it is essential to diversify the economy 
ana develop non-oil sectors to reduce the dependence on 
oil sector and have a balanced economy. This would not 
only expand the economic activity but would also Justify 
and legitimise the use and recycling of oil revenues. 
More attention may be focussed to the development of 
industry, mineral resources, fishing, pearling and tourism 
in view of UAE's excellent winter climate. In this context 
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a very visible area of great potential is foreign trade. 
Dubai possesses a long tradition of trade and has demons-
trated its advantages in this arena. The locational 
advantage and its accessibility to sea route make UAE 
ideal for further improving foreign trade coupled with the 
long entrepot trade experience that it is bestowed with. 
There is a strong case for the development of 
cosmetic and pharmaceutical industry as most of organic 
solvents used in pharmaceuticals and different waxes 
formulated in cosmetics are petroleum derivatives. 
Lastly/ economic cooperation and integration both 
at the inter-emirate level and regional level will go a 
long way in promoting economic interests of the country 
and the region. 
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